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KNOWLEDGE BY THE JURY OF A SETTLEMENT WHERE A
PLAINTIFF HAS SETTLED WITH ONE OR MORE
DEFENDANTS WHO ARE JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY LIABLE
I. INTRODUCTION
Presently there is a dispute concerning what evidence should be
presented to a jury and how juries should be instructed when one or
more jointly liable defendants settle with the plaintiff, and other defend-
ants remain in the lawsuit.' Several states have resolved this dispute
statutorily 2 and others have done so through judge-made law. 3 Three
approaches have been offered in response to this dispute. Under the
first approach, the jury is not informed of the settlement. 4 The second
approach informs the jury of the settlement only while withholding evi-
dence concerning the amount of settlement.5 The third approach in-
forms the jury of both the settlement and its amount. 6 This note will
discuss the split among the courts regarding the most equitable ap-
proach in this context. In order to discuss the issue ofjury settlements,
this note will begin with a review of the concept ofjoint tortfeasor liabil-
1. See, e.g., Luth v. Rogers and Babler Constr., 507 P.2d 761, 766 (Alaska
1973) (defendant not permitted to introduce evidence of covenant not to sue);
Steele v. Hash, 212 Cal. App. 2d 1, 4, 27 Cal. Rptr. 853, 855 (1963) (jury has
right to know of settlement and amount); Greenemeier v. Spencer, 719 P.2d
710, 714 (Colo. 1986) (jury should be informed of settlement); Peck v. Jac-
quemin, 196 Conn. 53, 58, 491 A.2d 1043, 1047 (1985) (settlement should not
be disclosed to jury); Brewer v. Payless Stations, Inc., 412 Mich. 673, 674-75,
316 N.W.2d 702, 703 (1982) (reference to settlement in presence ofjury prohib-
ited); Azure v. City of Billings, 182 Mont. 234, 247, 596 P.2d 460, 467 (1979)
(settlement must not be disclosed to jury); Theobold v. Angelos, 40 N.J. 295,
304, 191 A.2d 465, 469 (1963) (existence of settlement admissible evidence
while amount not disclosed); Cleere v. United Parcel Serv., 669 P.2d 785, 789
(Okla. Ct. App. 1983) (evidence of settlement not admissible to prove liability,
invalidity or amount of claim); Groves v. Compton, 280 S.E.2d 708, 711 (W. Va.
1981) (court has discretion to decide whether jury is to be informed of
settlement).
2. For a discussion of cases resolving the dispute statutorily, see infra notes
48-68 and accompanying text.
3. For a discussion of cases resolving the dispute through judge-made law,
see infra notes 77-138 and accompanying text.
4. Peck v. Jacquemin, 196 Conn. 53, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985). For a discus-
sion of cases holding that the jury is not to be informed of a settlement, see infra
notes 44-101 and accompanying text.
5. Greenemeier v. Spencer, 719 P.2d 710 (Colo. 1986). For a discussion of
cases holding that the jury is to be informed of a settlement, see infra notes 102-
28 and accompanying text.
6. Steele v. Hash, 212 Cal. App. 2d 1, 27 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1963). For a
discussion of cases holding that the jury is to be informed of a settlement and its
amount, see infra notes 129-38 and accompanying text.
(541)
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ity. This note will then discuss the courts' varying approaches to the
question of informing the jury of a settlement by a joint tortfeasor and
their rationales for each approach. Finally, this note will conclude that
the rule prohibiting the jury from learning of the settlement is the most
equitable since it is the least prejudicial to the plaintiff and the remain-
ing defendant(s).
II. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY OF JOINT TORTFEASORS
There is much confusion regarding the meaning and effect of the
term "joint tort" since it has been employed in varying circumstances. 7
Strictly defined, a joint tort occurs when the behavior of two or more
tortfeasors is such that it is proper to treat the conduct of each as the
conduct of the others.8 Thus, the existence of a concert of action 9 or a
breach of a common duty 10 must be evident." When a wrong is labeled
a joint tort, the tortfeasors will be held jointly and severally liable' 2 for
the resulting harm.' 3 Joint and several liability is imposed because the
plaintiff cannot prove the specific share of damage attributable to each
defendant. 14
7. 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS 1 (2d ed. 1986).
8. Id.
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979). Concert of action
has been defined as follows:
Parties are acting in concert when they act in accordance with an
agreement to cooperate in a particular line of conduct or to accomplish
a particular result .... The theory of the early common law was that
there was a mutual agency of each to act for the others, which made all
liable for the tortious acts of any one.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 comment a (1979); see also W. PROSSER,
D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
322-24 (5th ed. 1984) (discussion of concerted action).
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 878 (1979). Section 878 of the
Second Restatement of Torts provides: "[i]f two or more persons are under a com-
mon duty and failure to perform it amounts to tortious conduct, each is subject
to liability for the entire harm resulting from failure to perform the duty." Id.;
see, e.g., Bolles v. Kinton, 83 Colo. 147, 149, 263 P. 26, 27 (1928) ("When two
persons owe the same duty, and their acts tend to the same breach of duty, the
wrong may be regarded as joint, and both may be held liable."); One Hundred
Seventy Second Collins Corp. v. Rosene, 222 So. 2d 444, 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1969) (defendants failing to perform common duty charged as joint tortfeasors);
Lansky v. Goldstein, 141 Ga. App. 345, 346, 233 S.E.2d 437, 438-39 (1977) (co-
owners of property jointly liable for tortious injury of third party).
11. F. HARPER, supra note 7, at 1.
12. Id. ("[T]he distinguishing feature of a wrong to which the label joint
tort has been affixed is that the tortfeasors will be held jointly and severally-or
entirely-liable for the harm proximately resulting.").
13. Id.
14. Wigmore, Joint-Tortfeasors and Severance of Damages; Making the Innocent
Party Suffer Without Redress, 17 ILL. L. REV. 458 (1923). The innocent party is
relieved of the burden of proving what is impossible to prove-the specific share
of harm done by each tortfeasor. Id.; see also 1 J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAw
429 (1982) ("Joint and several liability was designed to obviate plaintiff's bur-
542 [Vol. 32: p. 541
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If there is neither a concert of action nor a breach of a common
duty, independent concurrent' 5 tortious acts may combine to cause a
single indivisible harm. 16 Although such concurrent acts do not fall
within the strict definition of a joint tort, 17 courts have imposed joint
and several liability on persons whose conduct causes a single indivisible
harm.18 The harm must be indivisible without means of apportioning
the damages.19 Thus, joint tortfeasors include those defendants whose
conduct is a proximate cause of an indivisible injury.20
Even after adopting comparative negligence, 2 1 most states have re-
den of proving which share of the injury each of several defendants was respon-
sible for; the burden of proof is removed from the innocent plaintiff and placed
upon the wrongdoers to determine among themselves.").
15. F. HARPER, supra note 7, at 3 n.9. Tortious acts need not be simultane-
ous to be concurrent. Id. Although concurrence requires no reference to time,
both torts must precede the damage. Id. at 4 n.9.
16. Id. at 3-4.
17. For the definition of a joint tort, see supra notes 9-10 and accompanying
text.
18. F. HARPER, supra note 7, at 4-5; see also Jackson, Joint Torts and Several
Liability, 17 TEX. L. REV. 399, 406 (1939) ("if the combined result [of the acts] is
a single and indivisible injury, the liability should be entire."). As a student edi-
tor of his law review, John H. Wigmiore proposed the single indivisible harm
rule. Wigmore, supra note 14, at 459. Wigmore commented: "The rule should
be: Wherever two or more persons by culpable acts, whether concerted or not, cause a
single general harm, not obviously assignable in parts to the respective wrongdoers, the in-
jured party may recover from each for the whole." Id. (emphasis in original).
19. F. HARPER, supra note 7, at 5. To avoid joint liability, a co-tortfeasor has
the burden of proving which tortious act caused which harm. WIGMORE, supra
note 14, at 458.
20. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 257 (2d ed. 1986); see also
American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899,
146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978). In American Motorcycle, the court in reviewing the con-
cept of joint and several liability noted: "Liability attaches to a concurrent
tortfeasor in this situation not because he is responsible for the acts of other
independent tortfeasors who may also have caused the injury, but because he is
responsible for all damage of which his own negligence was a proximate cause."
Id. at 587, 578 P.2d at 904, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
21. When the concept of comparative negligence was new, Dean Prosser
defined it as "a comparison of the fault of the plaintiff with that of the defendant.
It does not necessarily result in any division of the damages, but may permit full
recovery by the plaintiff notwithstanding his contributory negligence." V.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 29 (quoting Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH.
L. REV. 465 n.2 (1953)).
There are two principle forms of comparative negligence-pure and modi-
fied. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 30. Pure comparative negligence allows
a negligent plaintiff to recover even though his negligence was greater than the
defendant's. Id. Under modified comparative negligence, the plaintiff cannot
recover unless he is less negligent than the defendant. Id. at 30-31. Some forms
of modified comparative negligence permit the plaintiff to recover if his negli-
gence is equal to or less than the defendant's. Id.
For example, the comparative negligence statute of Pennsylvania permits a
plaintiff to recover where the plaintiff's negligence is equal to or less than the
negligence of the defendant. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (Purdon 1982).
Because the "plaintiff may recover the full amount of the allowed recovery from
1987] NOTE
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tained the doctrine ofjoint and several liability. 2 2 In those jurisdictions,
a plaintiff has the right to recover the total amount of his damages from
any tortfeasor. 23 While most states have adopted comparative negli-
gence, it is in those states which have retained the doctrine of joint and
several liability that the propriety of informing a jury of the existence or
amount of plaintiff's settlement with an absent tortfeasor is most often
debated. 24
any defendant against whom the plaintiff is not barred from recovery," joint and
several liability is retained under comparative negligence in Pennsylvania. Id.
For a discussion of the impact of comparative negligence in Pennsylvania on
settlements and releases, see Griffith, Hemsley & Burr, Contribution, Indemnity,
Settlements, and Releases: What the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Statute Did Not
Say, Symposium: Comparative Negligence in Pennsylvania, 24 VILL. L. REV. 494
(1979). For a discussion of the various forms of comparative negligence, see V.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 29-32.
22. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 258; see also Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., 97
Ill. 2d 104, 126, 454 N.E.2d 197, 207 (1983) (joint and several liability retained
under comparative negligence); Rozevink v. Faris, 342 N.W.2d 845, 849 (Iowa
1983) (doctrine ofjoint and several liability applicable under comparative negli-
gence unless plaintiff bears any comparative negligence); IDAHO CODE § 6-
803(4) (1979) (" 'joint tortfeasor' means one (1) of two (2) or more persons
jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property,
whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them");
UTAH CODE § 78-27-40(3) (1985) (" 'joint tortfeasor' means one of two or more
persons, jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or prop-
erty, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them");
Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-110(h) (1977) (other tortfeasor statutes "do not affect
the common law liability of the several joint tortfeasors to have judgments re-
covered and payment made from them individually by the injured person for the
whole injury"). For a further discussion of states that have retained joint and
several liability, see V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 258-61.
In Coney, the Supreme Court of Illinois advanced four reasons for retaining
joint and several liability co-existent with comparative negligence. 97 Ill. 2d at
121-22, 454 N.E.2d at 205. First, the court reasoned that apportioning fault on
a comparative basis does not render an indivisible injury "divisible" where a
defendant's negligence is a proximate cause of an indivisible injury. Id. at 121,
454 N.E.2d at 205. The court explained: "The mere fact that it may be possible
to assign some percentage figure to the relative culpability of one negligent de-
fendant as compared to another does not in any way suggest that each defend-
ant's negligence is not a proximate cause of the entire indivisible injury." Id. at
122, 454 N.E.2d at 205. Second, where a plaintiff is negligent and one or more
defendants is insolvent, the plaintiff is not forced to bear a portion of the loss
when joint and several liability is retained. Id. Third, although a plaintiff may be
partially at fault, his negligence relates only to his own safety while the negli-
gence of the defendants relates to a lack of due care for others. Id. Fourth, if a
defendant could not satisfy a judgment against him, an injured plaintiff would
not be adequately compensated for his injuries if joint and several liability were
eliminated. Id.
23. SeeJ. DOOLEY, supra note 14, at 685. The injury itself is indivisible, but
the responsibility for the injury is apportioned among two or more defendants.
See F. HARPER, supra note 7, at 29.
24. This note will not address issues relevant to practitioners in states that
have abolished joint and several liability. In the absence of joint and several
liability, comparative negligence requires a defendant to pay only his propor-
tionate share of the damages. SeeJ. DOOLEY, supra note 14, at 157. The fact that
4
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Tort actions involving joint tortfeasors do not always result simply
in a judgment against both defendants for a fixed amount. Rather, the
action can be quite complicated because one party has obtained a re-
lease pursuant to a settlement with the plaintiff.25 At common law, a
release given to one of two or more tortfeasors released all
tortfeasors. 26 To circumvent this often harsh result, a document known
as a covenant not to sue was used rather than a release.2 7 In such a
document, the plaintiff does not surrender his cause of action, but sim-
ply agrees not to enforce it.28 Today, many state statutes alter the com-
mon law rule to provide that a release does not discharge all
tortfeasors. 29 In addition, such statutes often dictate the effect of a set-
a plaintiff has settled with and released a tortfeasor will have no bearing on the
amount of the judgment against other tortfeasors. Id.
25. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 332. A distinction must be made
between a release and a satisfaction. Id. A release is a surrender of a cause of
action. Id. A satisfaction is acceptance of full compensation for an injury while a
release may be gratuitous or for inadequate consideration. Id.; see also F.
HARPER, supra note 7, at 32. The fact that a plaintiff has given a release does not
necessarily indicate that he has received full compensation-satisfaction-for his
injury. Id.
26. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 332. In the eyes of the law, there
was one cause of action against all tortfeasors liable for the same acts. Id.; see,
e.g., Duck v. Mayeu, [1892] 2 QB. 511, 513 ("a release granted to one joint
tortfeasor... operates as a discharge of the otherjoint tortfeasor ... the reason
being that the cause of action, which is one and indivisible, having been re-
leased, all persons otherwise liable thereto are consequently released").
27. Cox v. Pearl Inv. Co., 168 Colo. 67, 450 P.2d 60 (1969). The court held
that a "Covenant Not to Proceed with Suit" did not operate as a release where
the plaintiff expressly reserved the right to sue others who might be liable. Id. at
73-74, 450 P.2d at 63. The Second Restatement of Torts states "[a] covenant not to
sue one tortfeasor or not to proceed further against him does not discharge any
other tortfeasor liable for the same harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 885(2) (1979).
28. PROSSER & KEETON, supra, note 9, at 334. Although a technical evasion,
the form of the instrument is extremely important in some jurisdictions. Id.
Compare Oliver v. Williams, 19 Tenn. App. 54, 59, 83 S.W.2d 271, 274 (1935)
(written instrument was covenant not to sue where there was no stipulation that
instrument may have been pleaded as defense to action brought against cove-
nantee) with Byrd v. Crowder, 166 Tenn. 215, 217, 60 S.W.2d 171, 171 (1933)
(instrument containing stipulation that agreement may be pleaded as defense
treated as release). However, other jurisdictions regard intent over form and
look to the four corners of the document. Id.; see, e.g., Albert's Shoes, Inc. v.
Crabtree Constr. Co., 89 So. 2d 491, 493 (Fla. 1956) (courts must consider en-
tire document to ascertain intention of parties); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.
Boone, 85 So. 2d 834, 842 (Fla. 1956) (where intent can be determined from
language of instrument, such intent is conclusive in determination of nature of
instrument).
29. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 334. In 1939, the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved and adopted the Uni-
form Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAwS AND PROCEEDINGS OF
THE FORTY-NINTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 136 (1939) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
Section 4 of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act was intended to
change the common law view that a release given to one of two or more
5
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tlement on the plaintiff's claim against any remaining tortfeasors.3 0 For
example, according to the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act (UCATA) the plaintiff's claim is reduced by the greater of the
amount stipulated by the release or the amount of consideration paid
for the release.
3
'
Frequently, courts employ two different methods to determine the
effect of a settlement and release on a claim against a tortfeasor who
remains a party to the suit-a pro tanto 3 2 reduction or a pro rata 3 3 reduc-
tortfeasors automatically releases the others. Id. at 246. Section 4 of the 1939
Act provided:
A release by the injured person of one joint tortfeasor, whether
before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tortfeasors un-
less the release so provides; but reduces the claim against the other
tortfeasors in the amount of the consideration paid for the release, or
in any amount or proportion by which the release provides that the
total claim shall be reduced, if greater than the consideration paid.
Id. Eight states including Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, New Mexico,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and South Dakota enacted the Uniform Contribu-
tion Among Tortfeasors Act of 1939, although some states made changes from
the original Act. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, 12 U.L.A.
57, 59 commissioners' prefatory note (1955 revision) (1975) [hereinafter
UCATA].
Because of the changes some states made, the Commissioners drafted a re-
vision of the Act of 1939 and approved the revision in 1955. Id. Section 4,
providing for the effects of a release or covenant not to sue, remains similar. Id.
Section 4 of the 1955 revision of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act provides:
When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judg-
ment is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort
for the same injury or the same wrongful death:
(a) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability
for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but it
reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any amount stipu-
lated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the considera-
tion paid for it, whichever is the greater; and,
(b) It discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liabil-
ity to any other tortfeasor.
UCATA § 4, 12 U.L.A. at 98. Several states have enacted statutes which are
almost identical to Section 4. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-50.5-105 (Supp. 1985); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-113
(Michie 1977).
30. UCATA § 4(a), 12 U.L.A. at 98. The "release ... reduces the claim
against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release.., or in
the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater." Id. For
the full text of § 4, see supra note 29.
31. UCATA § 4(a), 12 U.L.A. at 98. For the relevant provision of the
UCATA that provides for the method of reduction of plaintiff's claim, see supra
note 30.
32. "The [pro tanto credit] rule dictates that consideration received from a
joint tortfeasor [for a release] reduces pro tanto (to that extent) any recovery
against the other tortfeasors." Wadle v. Jones, 312 N.W.2d 510, 512 (Iowa
1981) (citing Greiner v. Hicks, 231 Iowa 141, 146-47, 300 N.W. 727, 731
(1941)). For a discussion of the pro tanto credit rule, see infra notes 35-38 and
accompanying text.
546
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tion. 34 The pro tanto credit rule reduces the plaintiff's recovery against
the non-settling tortfeasors by the full amount of the settlement. 3 5 This
method permits the plaintiff full compensation for his injuries and sup-
ports the universal rule that there can be only one satisfaction for an
injury.3 6 Because courts espousing a pro tanto credit reduction need not
inform the jury of an absent joint tortfeasor, 3 7 the court will deduct the
settlement amount from the jury's verdict by following what is often
termed the "court rule."3 8
33. The pro rata credit rule reduces the recovery against the non-settling
tortfeasors by the amount of the settling tortfeasor's proportionate share of the
verdict. Wadle v.Jones, 312 N.W.2d 510, 513 (Iowa 1981). For a discussion of
the pro rata rule, see infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
34. J. DOOLEY, supra note 14, at 204 (Supp. 1985).
35. Id.; see also Mayhew v. Berrien County Rd. Comm'n, 414 Mich. 399, 326
N.W.2d 366 (1982). In Mayhew, the court interpreted Michigan's release statute
as providing for apro tanto reduction in damages. Id. at 407, 326 N.W.2d at 369.
The statute provided, in pertinent part: "When a release ... is given in good
faith ... [i]t reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors to the extent of any
amount stipulated by the release... or to the extent of the amount of the con-
sideration paid for it, whichever amount is greater." MicH. Comp. LAws ANN.
§ 600.2925d (West 1986).
36. Wadle v.Jones, 312 N.W.2d 510, 513 (Iowa 1981) (quoting Greiner v.
Hicks, 231 Iowa 141, 146-47, 300 N.W. 727, 731 (1941)). In Wadle, the Iowa
Supreme Court applied the pro tanto credit rule to affirm the trial court's reduc-
tion of the jury's verdict of $45,125.59 to $125.59 by deducting the plaintiff's
settlement with another defendant from the jury award. 312 N.W.2d at 512.
In American Motorcycle Ass 'n v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court in
dictum concluded that "a plaintiff's recovery from nonsettling tortfeasors
should be diminished only by the amount that the plaintiff has actually recov-
ered in a good faith settlement, rather than by an amount measured by the set-
tling tortfeasor's proportionate responsibility for the injury." 20 Cal. 3d 578,
604, 578 P.2d 899, 916, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 199 (1978). The relevant California
statute provides that a release "shall reduce the claims against the others in the
amount stipulated by the release ... or in the amount of the consideration paid
for it whichever is the greater." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980).
In Baget v. Shepard, a California appellate court interpreted the language
"amount stipulated" in that state's statute to mean "the percentage amount of
responsibility attributable to the settling tortfeasor's tortious conduct." J.
DOOLEY, supra note 14, at 203 (Supp. 1985) (citing Baget v. Shepard, 128 Cal.
App. 3d 433, 180 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1982)). The officially published opinion was
ordered removed from the California Appellate Reports. 128 Cal. App. 3d 433.
37. For a general discussion of cases where courts prohibit informing the
jury of plaintiff's settlement with a joint tortfeasor, see infra notes 44-101 and
accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., DeLude v. Rimek, 351 Ill. App. 466, 115 N.E.2d 561 (1953). In
DeLude, the court held:
[Ilt is the function of the jury to find the plaintiff's total damages, and
the function of the judge, upon application of the defendant after ver-
dict, to find the amount by which such verdict should be reduced by
virtue of any covenant made by the plaintiff with another concerned in
the commission of the tort.
Id. at 474, 115 N.E.2d at 565.
For other courts that follow the "court rule" or "court method," see Luth v.
Rogers and Babler Constr. Co., 507 P.2d 761, 768 (Alaska 1973) (court method
1987] NOTE
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In contrast, under thepro rata credit rule, the jury must have knowl-
edge of an absent joint tortfeasor 39 in order to apportion the negligence
of the non-settling tortfeasors. 40 A tortfeasor's pro rata share of liability
is determined by multiplying his percentage of liability, as determined
by the jury, by the amount of the verdict.4 1 Under the pro rata credit
rule, a plaintiff may receive a windfall if a large settlement precedes a
subsequently large judgment because the jury allocates, rightly or
wrongly, a heavy proportion of fault to the non-settling defendants. 4 2
avoids prejudice and encourages extra-judicial settlement); Egurrola v. Szychow-
ski, 95 Ariz. 194, 198-99, 388 P.2d 242, 245 (1964) (credit for previous payment
is properly determined by court method of DeLude); Brooks v. Daley, 242 Md.
185, 193, 218 A.2d 184, 188 (1966) (method of lettingjury apply prior payment
in reduction of verdict against non-settling joint tortfeasor is far less satisfactory
than that of having court make necessary reduction at conclusion of trial);
Brewer v. Payless Stations, Inc., 412 Mich. 673, 679, 316 N.W.2d 702, 705
(1982) (court method more consistent with policy of encouraging settlements).
The Luth court preferred the court method to the "jury method" which per-
mits the jury to know the amount of the settlement and to deduct that amount
from its award. Luth, 507 P. 2d at 768. Emphasizing that it is nearly impossible
to ensure that the jury makes the appropriate deduction from the total damages
awarded the Luth court noted that the preferable "court method" of calculating
damages avoids prejudice and encourages extra-judicial settlements. Id. For a
discussion of the facts of Luth, see infra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
For application of the "jury method" of calculating damages, see Steele v.
Hash, 212 Cal. App. 2d 1, 27 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1963) (affirming trial court's in-
struction to jury to deduct amount of settlement from verdict); Haley v. Byers
Transp., 394 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Mo. 1965) (jury instructed to deduct previous
settlement amount of $80,000 from verdict).
39. Although the jury must have knowledge of an absent joint tortfeasor, it
is not necessary that thejury know that an absent joint tortfeasor has settled. See
Azure v. City of Billings, 182 Mont. 234, 247, 596 P.2d 460, 467 (1979). For a
relevant quote from the Azure court, see infra note 187.
40. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 264; see also Bartels v. City of Willis-
ton, 276 N.W.2d 113 (N.D. 1979). In Bartels, the court concluded that a provi-
sion of a state statute governing the effect of a release on a plaintiff's claim
against a joint tortfeasor had been impliedly repealed by the enactment of a
comparative negligence act. Id. at 121. The release statute provided that a re-
lease "reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by
the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the
greater." Id. at 116 (emphasis added). The Bartels court concluded that the em-
phasized language was repealed and substituted with "of the relative degree of
fault (percentage of negligence) attributable to the released joint tortfeasors."
Id. at 121. The court concluded that as a result, the award of damages to the
plaintiff must be reduced by an amount proportionate to the percentage of neg-
ligence allocated to the released tortfeasor. Id. at 122.
41. Nobriga v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 67 Haw. 157, 161, 683 P.2d 389,
392 (1984). For example, suppose the jury returned a verdict of $50,000 dam-
ages against the defendant (the non-settling tortfeasor) and determined the de-
fendant was 75% liable and the settling tortfeasor was 25% liable. The
defendant's pro rata share is $37,500, and the settling tortfeasor's pro rata share is
$12,500.
42. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 264; see also Wadle v.Jones, 312 N.W.2d
510, 513 (Iowa 1981) ("Adoption of the pro rata credit rule would allow a claim-
ant who has made a settlement that exceeds the settling tortfeasor's pro rata
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However, the plaintiff may receive less than full compensation if he set-
tles with one tortfeasor for an amount less than the pro rata share of the
settling tortfeasor's liability. 43
While there are conflicting approaches to calculating damages
where the remaining co-defendant is liable and a co-defendant previ-
ously settled with the plaintiff, there is also conflict concerning what ref-
erences to the absent co-defendant or settlement can be made to the
jury. The remaining portion of this note will discuss the three varying
approaches to this dispute.
III. LIMITATION OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
WHEN ONE OR MORE JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE
DEFENDANTS SETTLE WITH PLAINTIFF
A. The Majority View: Withholding All Evidence of Settlement from the Jury
State courts have espoused three views as to what the jury should be
told about a settlement between the plaintiff and a tortfeasor when an-
other tortfeasor remains as a defendant in the action. 4 4 The majority
view prohibits the court in some forums from informing the jury of a
settlement. 4 5 This prohibition is invoked in order to avoid prejudice to
either party and to promote settlements.
4 6
share of the verdict to recover more than full compensation for personal
injuries.").
43. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 264. Because a pro rata share cannot be
calculated before the liability of the non-settling tortfeasors has been decided, a
plaintiff may be reluctant to settle because he does not know what he is giving up
when he gives a release to a tortfeasor. UCATA § 4, 12 U.L.A. at 99 (commis-
sioner's comment).
44. For a statement of the three views and cases which espouse each view,
see supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Luth v. Rogers and Babler Constr., 507 P.2d 761, 766 (Alaska
1973) (defendant not permitted to introduce evidence of covenant not to sue);
Peck v. Jacquemin, 196 Conn. 53, 58, 491 A.2d 1043, 1046 (1985) (settlement
should not be disclosed to jury). For a discussion of the extent to which evi-
dence of settlement is withheld from the jury, see infra notes 47-100 and accom-
panying text.
46. See, e.g., Luth v. Rogers and Babler Constr., 507 P.2d 761, 768 (Alaska
1973) (withholding information from jury regarding settlement avoids prejudice
and encourages extra-judicial settlements); Egurrola v. Szychowski, 95 Ariz. 194,
198, 388 P.2d 242, 244 (1964) (letter from settled defendant to plaintiff regard-
ing settlement amount properly excluded from evidence); Peck v. Jacquemin,
196 Conn. 53, 58, 491 A.2d 1043, 1046 (1985) (trial court erred by permitting
defendant counsel to cross-examine plaintiff concerning release); Ashby Div. of
Consol. Aluminum v. Dobkin, 458 So. 2d 335, 336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(settlement agreement inadmissible to rebut defendant's references to settled
tortfeasor as independent eyewitness); DeLude v. Rimek, 351 Ill. App. 466, 115
N.E.2d 561 (1953) (jury must calculate plaintiff's total damages absent evidence
of settlement); Brooks v. Daley, 242 Md. 185, 193, 218 A.2d 184, 189 (1966)
(informing jury of settlement misleads them in deliberations); Brewer v. Payless
Stations, Inc., 412 Mich. 673, 679, 316 N.W.2d 702, 705 (1982) (uncertainty of
juror reaction to existence of settlement is "foreseeable deterrent" to out of
9
Sharo: Knowledge by the Jury of a Settlement Where a Plaintiff Has Settl
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1987
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Under this majority view, numerous states have used a variety of
approaches regarding the extent to which evidence of settlement will be
withheld. These approaches have ranged from a complete withholding
of evidence of settlement to a withholding of evidence only for the pur-
poses of proving liability.4 7 Two states, Connecticut and Florida, have
statutorily provided for a complete prohibition.4 8 The Connecticut stat-
ute specifically prohibits the reading of a settlement agreement to a jury
or introducing a settlement into evidence during the trial.4 9 In Peck v.
court settlements); Azure v. City of Billings, 182 Mont. 234, 245, 596 P.2d 460,
467 (1979) (jury must not be "influenced by extraneous factors which will creep
into the jury's decision-making process"); Cleere v. United Parcel Serv., 669
P.2d 785, 789 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983) (disclosure of settlement agreement frus-
trates the policy "favoring settlements of lawsuits").
47. See, e.g., Ashby Div. of Consol. Aluminum v. Dobkin, 458 So. 2d 335,
337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) ("offers of compromise and settlement may not be
introduced except under unusual circumstances"); Weingrad v. Philadelphia
Elec. Co., 324 Pa. Super. 16, 20, 471 A.2d 100, 102 (1984) (settlement inadmis-
sible except where pleaded as complete defense); FED. R. EvID. 408 (evidence of
compromise not admissible to prove liability, invalidity or amount of claim, but
may be admitted if offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or preju-
dice of witness); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-216a (West Supp. 1986) (agree-
ment with any tortfeasor not to bring legal action is not to be read to jury or in
any other way introduced in evidence); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.041 (West 1986)
(fact of release or covenant not to sue shall not be made known to jury); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6141(c) (Purdon 1982) (settlement not admissible except
where pleaded as complete defense).
48. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-216a (West Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.041 (West 1986).
49. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-216a (West Supp. 1986). The statute
provides:
An agreement with any tortfeasor not to bring legal action or a
release of a tortfeasor in any cause of action shall not be read to a jury
or in any other way introduced in evidence by either party at any time
during the trial of the cause of action against any other joint
tortfeasors, nor shall any other agreement not to sue or release of claim
among plaintiffs or defendants in the action be read or in any other way
introduced to a jury.
Id. A provision of the original statute was found unconstitutional by the Con-
necticut Supreme Court in 1982. Seals v. Hickey, 186 Conn. 337, 441 A.2d 604
(1982). The original statute gave the court discretion to reduce the damage
award by the amount of the settlement. Id. at 350, 441 A.2d at 610. The Seals
court held that allowing the trial court to substitute its judgment for that of the
jury denied the parties their constitutional right to have their total damages de-
termined by a jury. Id. at 352, 441 A.2d at 611. In 1982, the Connecticut legis-
lature amended the statute to provide that when the trial court concludes that
the jury verdict is excessive or inadequate as a matter of law, it shall order a
remittitur or an additur. See Peck v.Jacquemin, 196 Conn. 53, 69-70, 491 A.2d
1043, 1052 (1985). If a party fails to comply with an order for an additur or
remittitur, the court must set aside the verdict and order a new trial. Id. at 70,
491 A.2d at 1052.
In Seals, the court indicated that the statute was introduced into the legisla-
ture "[t]o prohibit the reading of agreements not to sue or releases of claims
before a jury, which often prejudices a party to the action." 186 Conn. at 345, 441
A.2d at 608 (emphasis supplied by the court).
[Vol. 32: p. 541
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Jacquemin,5 0 the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the state statute
precluded defense counsel from introducing evidence of plaintiff's set-
tlement with another tortfeasor, noting specifically that the statute "ex-
presse[d] the better policy, removing whatever possibility for prejudice
may exist ".... 51
Florida statutorily provides that a jury shall not be told of a release
given by the plaintiff to a tortfeasor.5 2 In Ashby Division of Consolidated
Aluminum Corp. v. Dobkin,5 3 the appellate court held that a jury should
not have been told that a witness, who had been a defendant, had settled
with the plaintiff.54 In Ashby, the plaintiff, a plumber, was injured when
he fell while descending from a ladder manufactured by defendant Con-
solidated Aluminum Corporation and provided by the owner of the
house on which he was working. 55 Plaintiff sued both the owner of the
house and the manufacturer of the ladder, but prior to trial settled with
the house owner. 5 6 When defense counsel introduced the house owner
as a witness and referred to him as an "independent eyewitness," plain-
tiff's counsel informed the jury of the house owner's settlement with
plaintiff.5 7 Relying on Florida's statute prohibiting a jury from having
knowledge of a settlement, the Florida Court of Appeals stated that the
trial court erred in permitting the plaintiff to introduce evidence of the
settlement to rebut the defendant's references to the settled defendant
as an "independent eyewitness."' 58 The court reasoned that since public
policy favors settlements, evidence of a settlement is only admissible
under unusual circumstances. 5 9
50. 196 Conn. 53, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985). The plaintiff Peck was a passen-
ger in a car involved in a two-car accident. Id. at 54, 491 A.2d at 1044. The
injured Peck sued the drivers of both cars and subsequently settled for $100,000
with the driver in whose car he had been a passenger. Id. Over the plaintiff's
objection, the trial court permitted the remaining defendant Roy to introduce
evidence of the settlement at trial. Id. at 56, 491 A.2d at 1045. In addition, the
trial court instructed the jurors to consider the $100,000 settlement in mitiga-
tion of any damages which they might award the plaintiff. Id. at 57 n.8, 491 A.2d
at 1046 n.8. The jury returned a verdict for $35,000 against the defendant Roy.
Id. at 60, 491 A.2d at 1047.
51. Id. at 59, 491 A.2d at 1047 (quoting Kosko v. Kohler, 176 Conn. 383,
387, 407 A.2d 1009, 1011 (1978)).
52. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.041(3) (West 1986). Section 768.041(3) pro-
vides that "[t]he fact of such a release or covenant not to sue, or that any defend-
ant has been dismissed by order of the court shall not be made known to the
jury." Id.
53. 458 So. 2d 335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
54. Id. at 336.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. The court did not accept the plaintiff's argument that the "defend-
ant had opened the door to the issue of the witness's credibility." Id. at 337.
For the relevant Florida statute for excluding evidence of settlement, see supra
note 52.
59. Id. One court noted that "unusual circumstances exist where some spe-
1987] NOTE
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Statutorily, Pennsylvania provides a narrow exception to an eviden-
tiary rule prohibiting the admission of a settlement. 60 The statute pro-
vides that a settlement is not admissible except where a final settlement
is pleaded as a complete defense. 6 1 In Weingrad v. Philadelphia Electric
Co.,62 the Pennsylvania Superior Court relied on the statute in holding
that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of plaintiff's settlement
with another party.63 In Weingrad, plaintiff sued a pilot and the Philadel-
phia Electric Company (PECO) for the death of her husband, a flight-
instructor.64 Plaintiff settled with the pilot before trial, a fact that the
cies of fraud or other questionable practice is indulged in to procure or influ-
ence such testimony" of a witness. City of Coral Gables v. Jordan, 186 So. 2d
60, 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (quoting Fenberg v. Rosenthal, 348 Ill. App. 510,
518, 109 N.E.2d 402, 405 (1952)), aff'd, 191 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1966).
See also Charles McArthur Dairies, 449 So. 2d 998, 999 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (disclosing release and amount of settlement may unduly influence jury as
to plaintiff's damages); Henry v. Beacon Ambulance Serv., 424 So. 2d 914, 915
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (trial court should have granted mistrial after defend-
ant's counsel informed jury during closing argument that plaintiff had settled
with another defendant); Webb v. Priest, 413 So. 2d 43, 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982) (reversible error for trial court to permit defendants to bring repeatedly
to jury's attention fact that two other defendants had been dismissed). But see
Cenvill Communities, Inc. v. Patti, 458 So. 2d 778 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984),
review denied, 467 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1985). In Patti, a Florida appellate court
concluded that mention of a "claim" is not specifically prohibited by the Florida
release statute. Id. at 780 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.041(3) (West 1986)).
While walking in Century Village, the plaintiff's husband was struck and killed
by a car driven by the defendant Hoffman. Id. at 779. Plaintiff sued Hoffman,
Century Village and Cenvill Communities and settled with Hoffman prior to
trial. Id. Cenvill asserted by affirmative defense that Hoffman's act was an inter-
vening cause and the sole proximate cause of the husband's death. Id. In his
opening statement, counsel for one defendant said, " 'we expect the evidence
and testimony in this case will reflect [that] Mrs. Patti made a claim against Mr.
Hoffman as a result of this accident.' " Id. Although the plaintiff asserted that
the statement should not have been admitted because "where a claim has been
made the inference arises that a settlement has been reached," the appellate
court concluded that defendant's references to Hoffman were properly admitted
since Cenvill had asserted by affirmative defense that Hoffman's act was an inter-
vening cause, and because the plaintiff's attorney had failed to object to defend-
ant's references to the settlement agreement throughout his closing argument.
Id. at 780-81.
60. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 614 1(c) (Purdon 1982). Section 614 1(c)
provides: "Except in an action in which final settlement and release has been
pleaded as a complete defense, any settlement or payment referred to in subsec-
tions (a) [personal injuries] and (b) [damages to property] shall not be admissi-
ble in evidence on the trial of any matter." Id.
61. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 614 1(c) (Purdon 1982). For the text of the
Pennsylvania statute prohibiting admissibility of a settlement except where it is
pleaded as a complete defense, see supra note 60.
62. 324 Pa. Super. 16, 471 A.2d 100 (1984).
63. Id. at 20, 471 A.2d at 102.
64. Id. at 17, 471 A.2d at 101. The plaintiff's decedent was administering a
flight review to the pilot. Id. During a simulated low altitude engine failure, the
airplane hit a pole owned by PECO. Id.
12
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trial court announced to the jury.6 5 When the jury rendered a verdict in
favor of PECO, plaintiff filed an appeal contending that the trial court
erred in informing the jury of the settlement. 66 The Pennsylvania Supe-
rior Court agreed that the trial court erred; however, the appellate court
concluded that the plaintiff had not been prejudiced by the error.67 The
court reasoned that because the jury had not found the pilot negligent,
they could not have assumed that the only liable party had settled.6 8
Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, regarding compromise
and offers to compromise, prohibits admission of evidence of a compro-
mise introduced to prove liability, invalidity or amount of a claim. 69
65. Id. The trial judge informed the jury:
I am not asking you to draw any inference from the facts of the settle-
ment, though various Counsel may wish to ask you to draw an infer-
ence. You may or may not consider the facts of this settlement
significant in evaluating the position of the parties and the testimony of
the witness.
Id. at 18, 471 A.2d at 101.
66. Id. The trial court had denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial. Id. at
17-18, 471 A.2d at 101. Plaintiff argued that "introduction of the settlement
created the risk of confusing the jury and causing speculation as to whether the
liable party was still in the case, or whether the plaintiff had received all of the
damages to which she was entitled." Id. at 21, 471 A.2d at 103.
67. Id. at 22-23, 471 A.2d at 103-04.
68. Id. at 22, 471 A.2d at 104. In strong dissent, Judge Montgomery,
stated:
I believe that the legislative rationale for that statute [42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6141] was that ajury, upon learning of a settlement, could
decide to reduce or eliminate any award to an otherwise eligible plain-
tiff based upon the conclusion that the plaintiff had already received a
recovery to the extent that he or she was entitled to or satisfied within
the settlement which had been reached. Thejurors could conclude that
to award further damages would create a windfall. Moreover since the
jury specifically found . . . [the released defendant] not to have been
negligent in this case, it is reasonable to speculate that the jury mem-
bers could have reached the conclusion that the Plaintiff had received
some monies from that defendant to which she was not entitled, so that
the jury would therefore think it fair to deny her any recovery from any
other party, against whom an award might otherwise have been made.
There is simply no way to determine whether or not such prejudicial
considerations resulted from the disclosure of settlement to the jury in
the instant case.
Id. at 23, 471 A.2d at 104 (Montgomery, J., dissenting).
69. FED. R. EviD. 408. Rule 408 on compromise and offers to compromise
provides:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or
(2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable considera-
tion in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was
disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove lia-
bility for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct
or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissi-
ble. This rule does not require exclusion of any evidence otherwise
discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compro-
mise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the
evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or preju-
13
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However, rule 408 "does not require exclusion when the evidence is
offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a wit-
ness." 70 In Young v. Verson Al/steel Press Co.,71 the defendant sought to
introduce evidence of plaintiff's settlement with a joint tortfeasor to
minimize its potential exposure in damages.7 2 The defendant con-
tended that the evidence was offered for "another purpose," to prevent
dice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an
effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
Id. "While the rule is ordinarily phrased in terms of offers of compromise, it is
apparent that a similar attitude must be taken with respect to completed com-
promises when offered against a party thereto." FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory
committee's note.
In recent decisions, federal courts have applied rule 408 to prohibit admis-
sion of a settlement. See, e.g., McInnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 248 (1st Cir.
1985) (error for trial court to admit release offered as relevant to issue of causa-
tion); Belton v. Fibreboard Corp., 724 F.2d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 1984) (error for
trial court to instruct jury to consider settlement as part of proof of claim);
McHann v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 713 F.2d 161, 166-67 (5th Cir. 1983)
(error to admit settlement to establish liability of defendant); United States v.
Contra Costa County Water Dist., 678 F.2d 90, 92 (9th Cir. 1982) (inadmissibil-
ity of settlement negotiations encourages full and open disclosure, furthering
public policy favoring settlements); Ramada Dev. Co. v. Rauch, 644 F.2d 1097,
1107 (5th Cir. 1981) (collection of statements made in course of effort to com-
promise inadmissible); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Hudson United Bank,
493 F. Supp. 434, 445 (D. N.J. 1980) (utilizing settlement as admission of valid-
ity of claim prohibited).
Several states have enacted statutes that are similar to rule 408 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE
408 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2408 (West 1980); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 904.08 (West 1985). In Cleere v. United Parcel Serv., the Oklahoma Court of
Appeals applied OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2408 and found that the trial court
committed reversible error by permitting defendant to introduce plaintiff's set-
tlement with other tortfeasors for the purpose of reducing the amount of dam-
ages awarded to plaintiff. 669 P.2d 785, 790 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983).
On one occasion, the Wisconsin Supreme Court permitted disclosure of a
settlement agreement offered to prove bias or prejudice of a witness as pro-
scribed under Wis. STAT. ANN. § 904.08. Hareng v. Blanke, 90 Wis. 2d 158, 168,
279 N.W.2d 437, 441-42 (1979) (settlement agreement admitted to show preju-
dice on part of plaintiff).
70. FED. R. EVID. 408; see also Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288,
1292-93 (9th Cir. 1985) (indemnity agreement admitted to show relationship of
parties and to attack credibility of defendants' witnesses), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
882 (1986); Belton v. Fibreboard Corp., 724 F.2d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 1984) (ad-
mission of settlement for purpose of explaining to jury why co-defendants were
not in court is not abuse of discretion); Breuer Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Toronado Sys.
of America, 687 F.2d 182, 185 (7th Cir. 1982) (evidence of settlement negotia-
tions admissible to rebut defendants' assertions that they were unaware of issues
until suit was filed); Central Soya Co. v. Epstein Fisheries, Inc., 676 F.2d 939,
944 (7th Cir. 1982) (testimony admissible for purpose of demonstrating terms of
settlement); California Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. Kansas City Terminal Warehouse
Co., 602 F. Supp. 183, 188 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (settlement negotiations admissible
to explain why plaintiffs delayed in disposing of sugar), afftd, 788 F.2d 1331 (8th
Cir. 1986).
71. 539 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
72. Id. at 194. Defendant asserted that it could suffer prejudice if the jury
554
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unnecessary and substantial prejudice from accruing to defendant. 73
However, the court noted that defendant's offer of plaintiff's settlement
was to mitigate the amount of any possible jury award by showing that
the plaintiff had received some compensation for his injuries.74 Reason-
ing that defendant's contention of "another purpose" was merely an at-
tempt to circumvent what rule 408 expressly prohibits, the court refused
to admit evidence of the settlement as proof of the invalidity or amount
of plaintiff's claim. 7 5 Additionally, the court recognized that admitting
the settlement in this case would have an effect on future plaintiffs
presented with a settlement offer from only one of several defendants by
undermining the public policy of rule 408 of encouraging settlements. 76
While various jurisdictions have differed on the extent to which evi-
dence of settlement should be withheld, those jurisdictions withholding
.such evidence have generally been in agreement with the rationale for
withholding evidence. 7 7 The rationale has focused on both prejudice to
the parties and the effect on settlements. 78 In DeLude v. Rimek, 79 an Illi-
was mislead and thought defendant was the only possible source for compensat-
ing plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 195.
73. Id.
74. Id.; see also Belton v. Fibreboard Corp., 724 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1984). In
Belton, the court of appeals held that the trial court violated rule 408 by directing
the jury to consider plaintiff's settlements with fifteen co-defendants as part of
the proof of the amount of plaintiff's claim. Id. at 505.
75. 539 F. Supp. at 195; see also McHann v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
713 F.2d 161, 166 (5th Cir. 1983) (trial court erred in admitting covenant not to
sue because jury could have perceived that joint tortfeasor who paid plaintiff
substantial settlement was liable).
76. 539 F. Supp. at 197-98. The advisory committee noted that a consist-
ently impressive ground to exclude evidence of a compromise is promotion of
public policy favoring the compromise and settlement of disputes. FED. R. EvID.
408 advisory committee's note.
77. See, e.g., Luth v. Rogers and Babler Constr., 507 P.2d 761 (Alaska 1973);
Egurrola v. Szychowski, 95 Ariz. 194, 388 P.2d 242 (1964); DeLude v. Rimek,
351 Ill. App. 466, 115 N.E.2d 561 (1953); Brooks v. Daley, 242 Md. 185, 218
A.2d 184 (1966); Brewer v. Payless Stations, Inc., 412 Mich. 673, 316 N.W.2d
702 (1982); Azure v. City of Billings, 182 Mont. 234, 596 P.2d 460 (1979). For a
discussion of the rationale of the courts that have ruled in this manner, see infra
notes 78-101 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Luth v. Rogers and Babler Constr., 507 P.2d 761, 768 (Alaska
1973) (jury's knowledge of settlement and its amount may prejudice plaintiff and
unreleased defendant and discourage extra-judicial settlements); DeLude v.
Rimek, 351 Ill. App. 466, 474, 115 N.E.2d 561, 565 (1953) (introducing cove-
nant not to sue is potentially prejudicial to plaintiffs and tends to discourage
settlements); Brewer v. Payless Stations, Inc., 412 Mich. 673, 679, 316 N.W.2d
702, 705 (1982) ("uncertainty of juror reaction to the fact of an indemnity re-
lease is considered as a foreseeable deterrent to settlements between plaintiffs
and codefendants"); Azure v. City of Billings, 182 Mont. 234, 244, 596 P.2d 460,
466 (1979) (plaintiff prejudiced by court's instruction that he had settled with
codefendant).
79. 351 Il1. App. 466, 115 N.E.2d 561 (1953). In DeLude, the plaintiffs sus-
tained injuries when the car in which they were passengers collided with a car
driven by an intoxicated driver. Id. at 467-68, 115 N.E.2d at 562. Plaintiffs sued
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nois appellate court held that introducing evidence of a covenant not to
sue was potentially prejudicial to a plaintiff because a jury may consider
the covenant as conclusive proof that the covenantee is the responsible
party and the remaining defendants should be exculpated.8 0 Moreover,
the DeLude court reasoned that admitting evidence of a covenant not to
sue would tend to discourage settlements because of the potential preju-
dice to the plaintiff.8
In Luth v. Rogers and Babler Construction Co. ,82 the Supreme Court of
Alaska affirmed the trial court's decision prohibiting the defendant from
introducing evidence of a covenant not to sue for the purpose of im-
peaching the plaintiff's testimony that he had never asserted any claims
against another person as a result of his injuries.83 Plaintiffs traveling in
one vehicle were injured when their car collided with another vehicle.8 4
The driver of the other automobile did not own the vehicle he was driv-
ing.8 5 Plaintiffs did not sue the driver of the other automobile, but in-
stead sued both the automobile owner and the driver's employer.8 6
Prior to trial, plaintiffs executed a covenant not to sue for a considera-
tion of $3500 from the automobile owner.8 7 The trial court had held
that the covenant was irrelevant since the issue was whether the defend-
ant employer was vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
both the intoxicated driver and the owners of an establishment that allegedly
sold liquor to the driver. Id. Subsequently, however, plaintiffs gave the driver a
covenant not to sue in consideration for payments made to plaintiffs by the
driver. Id.
80. Id. at 473, 115 N.E.2d at 565. The court stated:
[T]here is always an effort on the part of the defense to put the cove-
nant before the jury and to make the most of it during the course of the
trial. In the instant case, time and again, and with more repetition than
was necessary to preserve their record, defendants stressed their objec-
tions to evidence of damages, on the ground that the covenantee had
paid such damages.
Id.
81. Id. at 474, 115 N.E. 2d at 565. In addition, the DeLude court held that it
was the function of the court to reduce the jury's verdict by the consideration
received by the plaintiff for a covenant not to sue. Id. For a discussion of the
"court rule," see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
In Burger v. Van Severen, the Second District Appellate Court of Illinois fol-
lowed DeLude in reversing the trial court's decision permitting evidence of an
$11,000 settlement to be introduced. 39 Ill. App. 2d 205, 214, 188 N.E.2d 373,
377 (1963). Similarly, in Egurrola v. Szychowski, the Supreme Court of Arizona
followed DeLude and held that plaintiffs improperly introduced evidence of the
covenant not to sue they had given to one of the defendants. 95 Ariz. 194, 198-
99, 388 P.2d 242, 244-45 (1964).
82. 507 P.2d 761 (Alaska 1973). For the facts of Luth, see infra text accom-
panying notes 84-87.
83. 507 P.2d at 766.
84. Id. at 762.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. Plaintiff had executed the covenant not to sue before bringing suit
against Rogers and Babler Construction Co. Id.
[Vol. 32: p. 541
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nor.8 8 More importantly, the court stated that allowing the jury to have
knowledge of a covenant can result in prejudice to both plaintiff and
defendant.8 9 The court noted that the unreleased defendant could be
prejudiced if the jury imputed his negligence by what appeared to be a
virtual admission of negligence by the covenantee. 90 Conversely, the
court noted that the plaintiff risks prejudice if the jury views the settle-
ment as evidence of the covenantee's total responsibility for the injury
and the defendant's freedom from fault. 9 1
88. Id. Although Jack was returning home from his work site, there was a
question as to whether his commute was within the scope of his employment
since he received additional remuneration for his daily commute. Id. at 762-63.
The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for a directed verdict holding that as a
matter of law, Rogers was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id. at
762. The Supreme Court of Alaska reversed the lower court and remanded for a
new trial, noting that scope of employment questions must be resolved by the
jury when conflicting inferences can be drawn from undisputed facts. Id. at 764.
89. Id. at 768. The court concluded that the "court rule" enunciated in
DeLude was the preferred method of deducting the amount a plaintiff has re-
ceived as consideration for a covenant. Id. For a statement of the court's hold-
ing in DeLude, see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
90. 507 P.2d at 768; see also Brooks v. Daley, 242 Md. 185, 218 A.2d 184
(1966). In Brooks, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision prohibit-
ing evidence of the plaintiff's settlement with a tortfeasor impleaded by the de-
fendant as a third-party defendant. Id. at 189, 193, 218 A.2d at 186, 188. The
appellate court stated:
Although evidence of a settlement with the third-party defendant
would have provided an additional means for attacking [the plaintiff's]
credibility, the trial court was justified in excluding any reference to a
settlement because of the confusion it could have caused the jury in
assessing damages. There existed, moreover, a very real possibility
that the settlement could have been misconstrued as an admission of
liability by [the third-party defendant].
Id. at 194, 218 A.2d at 189.
91. 507 P.2d at 768. Mere knowledge of a settlement may not reflect the
facts which led the plaintiff to settle for a specified amount. See, e.g., Azure v.
City of Billings, 182 Mont. 234, 596 P.2d 460 (1979). In Azure, the plaintiff set-
tled with one defendant for $10,000, the limits of his insurance policy, yet
sought approximately one million dollars from the city of Billings for failing to
render prompt medical treatment. Id. at 237-38, 596 P.2d at 467. Although the
trial court had granted plaintiff's motion in limine to exclude all evidence relative
to the settlement, the court instructed the jury that plaintiff had settled with
another party for $10,000 and that if the jury found for plaintiff, it should deduct
$10,000 from the damage award. Id. at 244, 596 P.2d at 466. Criticizing the
lower court's failure to avoid prejudice to the plaintiff, the appellate court re-
versed, noting that the court's instruction had accomplished for the defendant
that which the court had ruled improper. Id. at 246, 596 P.2d at 467. The court
further stated:
From a practical standpoint it is natural that in a situation such as
this a jury will be curious as to why all potential defendants are not
before the court where evidence is presented that more than one per-
son may be responsible for the resulting injuries .... Nonetheless, the
trial court can tell the jury . . . that the court will take care of these
factors at a later time after the jury has reached its verdict.
Id. at 246-47, 596 P.2d at 467. However, the court conceded that there are occa-
sions when the jury should be informed of the amount of settlement. Id. at 247,
17
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In one of the most recent decisions expressing the view that evi-
dence of settlement should be withheld from a jury, the Supreme Court
of Michigan, in Brewer v. Payless Stations, Inc. ,92 reinforced the traditional
rationales for withholding such evidence. 93 The Brewer court reasoned
that informing the jury of the existence and amount of the plaintiff's
settlement with a defendant prejudiced both the plaintiff and the re-
maining defendant. 94 The court noted that if the jury views a settlement
as an admission of liability by the settling tortfeasor, the jury may con-
clude that the responsible party has settled. 95 Conversely, the court in-
dicated that a settlement with one defendant could suggest liability of
the non-settling defendant.9 6 Moreover, the court explained that how
the jury views the amount of the settlement received by the plaintiff could
prejudice either the plaintiff or the defendant. 9 7 The court noted that if
a settlement is large, this might suggest a higher value for the jury's
verdict, and if the amount is small, the jury may attempt to compensate
by a higher award. 9 8 Conversely, the court noted that a large settlement
may convince the jury that the plaintiff has received adequate compensa-
tion, and a small settlement may create the impression that the total
value of the plaintiff's claim is small. 9 9 The court emphasized that juries
are subject to suggestion, and that to burden them with facts that have
no bearing on the liability of the non-settling defendant is unneces-
596 P.2d at 467. One such occasion occurs when there is a factual question
regarding a settlement. Id. Another example occurs where there must be reap-
portionment of damages among several tortfeasors who have been held liable at
a separate trial. Id.
When the issue of liability is closely contested, a jury's verdict is not infre-
quently the result of a compromise of varying views. Powers v. Temple, 250
S.C. 149, 160, 156 S.E.2d 759, 764 (1967). Jurors may agree to a verdict for the
defendant upon concluding that the plaintiff has already been substantially com-
pensated for his injuries. Id.
92. 412 Mich. 673, 316 N.W.2d 702 (1982). In Brewer, the plaintiff suffered
injuries in an automobile accident which occurred when an automobile with un-
known occupants drove recklessly from a Payless Gas Station in the direction of
plaintiff's vehicle, causing plaintiff's vehicle to swerve dangerously into traffic
where it was struck by an oncoming automobile. Id. at 674, 316 N.W.2d at 703.
The collision caused the fuel tank of plaintiff's vehicle to explode and plaintiff
was severely burned. Id. Plaintiff sued Payless Stations, alleging negligent sta-
tion design, and General Motors, alleging negligent design of the fuel tank. Id.
Prior to trial, plaintiff settled his claim against General Motors in return for
$150,000. Id.
93. Id. at 677-78, 316 N.W.2d at 704-05.
94. Id. at 678, 316 N.W.2d at 705.
95. Id. at 677, 316 N.W.2d at 704.
96. Id. at 678, 316 N.W.2d at 705.
97. Id. The court stated that jury "rule is a two-edged sword. It cuts both
ways. Some of the plaintiff's arguments ... could be used by a defendant." Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. "The amount of the settlement, if large might tend to suggest a
higher value of a claim. If small, the jury might tend to 'make it up' by a higher
verdict as to the non-settling tortfeasor." Id.
18
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sary. 0 0 Finally, the court noted that the jury need not know the amount
of the settlement since the court will make the appropriate deduction
from the jury's damages award. 10 1
B. A Moderate Approach: Informing the Jury of a Settlement, But
Withholding Evidence of Amount
Some jurisdictions have chosen an intermediate approach to the is-
sue of the extent of ajury's knowledge of a plaintiff's out-of-court settle-
ment with one or more joint tortfeasors. 10 2 That is, these courts inform
the jury of the fact of settlement, but not the amount paid.' 0 3 Courts
espousing this view assert that advising the jury of a settlement avoids
prejudice that can occur ifjurors speculate about absent tortfeasors.' 0 4
In Theobold v. Angelos, 10 5 the Supreme Court of New Jersey con-
cluded that it is not only wise psychologically, but fair to inform the jury
of the fact of settlement because speculation as to why some defendants
are absent is avoided.' 0 6 In Theobold, defendant Anderson lost control
of his automobile, which came to rest partly on the plaintiff Theobold's
property. 10 7 Theobold, his son-in-law Golden, and a police car driven
by Officer Angelos arrived at the scene of the accident.' 0 8 Golden had
been standing near the police car and Theobold had been standing be-
tween Anderson's vehicle and the police car when defendant Conaty
crashed into the police car pinning Theobold's legs between the two
vehicles. 10 9 Theobold, severely injured, and Golden, slightly injured,
sued Anderson, Conaty, Officer Angelos and the township for damages
100. Id. at 676, 316 N.W.2d at 705. Juries are subject to confusion from the
mass of probative evidence and its relationship to the instructions from the
court. Id.
101. Id. The Brewer court, per curiam, adopted the "court rule" for comput-
ing damages when it held that the jury should not be informed of a prior settle-
ment. Id. Interestingly, the court characterized its adoption of the "court rule"
as a "matter of policy." Id. at 675, 316 N.W.2d at 703. For a discussion of the
"court rule" for computing damages, see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., Greenemeier v. Spencer, 719 P.2d 710 (Colo. 1986); The-
obold v. Angelos, 40 NJ. 295, 191 A.2d 465 (1963). For a discussion of these
cases, see infra notes 105-28 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Greenemeier v. Spencer, 719 P.2d 710, 714 (Colo. 1986)("We hold that the fact of settlement, but not the amount paid, should be
brought to the jury's attention, absent special circumstances."); Theobold v.
Angelos, 40 NJ. 295, 304, 191 A.2d 465, 469 (1963) (fact of settlement, but not
amount paid, is generally brought to attention ofjury at trial).
104. Greenemeier v. Spencer, 719 P.2d 710, 715 (Colo. 1986); see also The-
obold v. Angelos, 40 N.J. 295, 304, 191 A.2d 465, 469 (1963) ("When the jury
has such knowledge, speculation is avoided as to the reason for the absence
from the proceedings of an additional potentially liable person.").
105. 40 N.J. 295, 191 A.2d 465 (1963).
106. Id. at 304, 191 A.2d at 469.
107. Id. at 298, 191 A.2d at 466.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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for their injuries and losses.10 Theobold settled his claim against
Conaty and Anderson for $88,500 and $1,500 respectively."I ' Golden
settled with Conaty for $1,500 and with Anderson for $500.112 In the
trial against the remaining defendants, Angelos and the township, the
court referred to the settlements with Conaty and Anderson in general
but ambiguous terms and failed to inform the jurors that their verdict
was to represent full compensation for all the plaintiffs' damages arising
from the accident.' 13 As a result of this instruction, the jury awarded a
$65,000 judgment to Theobold and a $1,000 judgment to Golden. 1 14
On appeal, the Supreme Court of NewJersey stated that if the court
informs the jury of the settlement, the court must also give clear instruc-
tions to assure that the jurors appreciate the significance of the settle-
ment.1 15 The court noted that the jury's primary obligation is to decide
whether the non-settling defendant is liable for the plaintiff's inju-
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 298-99, 191 A.2d at 466.
113. Id. at 305, 191 A.2d at 470. The trial court had instructed in part:
This case originally had two other defendants. You have heard, of
course, throughout the case that both of these defendants, namely,
Francis Conaty and James Anderson have already settled their cases
with both of these plaintiffs. The Court, of course, will not tell you the
amount of the settlement that was made because you are to figure this
case, if you feel that these plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment, on what
each of the plaintiffs' verdicts should be, assuming of course that you
find that they are entitled to a verdict against the two present defend-
ants, namely Leon Angelos and Cherry Hill Township.
Id. at 306, 191 A.2d at 470.
114. Id. at 299, 191 A.2d at 467.
115. Id. at 304, 191 A.2d at 469. The high court noted that at no point had
the trial court clearly charged the jurors that their verdict should fully compen-
sate the plaintiff for all of his damages arising from the accident. Id. at 307-08,
191 A.2d at 471. Thus, the court suggested that a trial court must carefully
instruct the jury as to their precise role in the assessment of damages, stating:
First, the jurors must decide on the evidence whether the defend-
ant on trial was guilty of negligence which was solely or partly responsi-
ble for the incident which produced the plaintiff's injuries and
pecuniary losses. After reaching an affirmative conclusion on that sub-
ject, they should then pass to a determination of the amount of com-
pensation to be awarded. Here they have to realize that their duty is to
give to the plaintiff the total sum which represents reasonable compen-
sation for his injuries and losses .... The computation must be made
without regard to ... the total number of persons involved in the inci-
dent which caused the damages, including those who have made settle-
ments with plaintiff, and without any deduction based upon what the
jurors think plaintiff may or should have received in those settle-
ments .... A properly compensatory verdict can be expected once the
trial court, by its instructions, engenders in the minds of the jurors an
appreciation that injustice and inadequate recovery will fall upon the
plaintiff if, on the basis of some effort at allocation among the remain-
ing defendants and the settlers, they lower the total sum he is entitled
to receive as measured by the elements of damage described above.
Id. at 304-05, 191 A.2d at 469-70.
[Vol. 32: p. 541560
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ries. 1 16 The court noted further that once the defendant is found liable,
the jury must determine the amount of compensation to be awarded.' 17
At this point, the court emphasized, the jurors must be instructed to fix
damages in an amount representing total compensation for all of the
plaintiff's injuries and losses.'' 8 The court emphasized that the jury
must be instructed to award damages without regard to the number of
defendants, including those defendants who may have settled, and with-
out reducing their judgment by the settlement amount.1 19 The court
further reasoned that thorough instructions ensure an adequate recov-
ery by admonishing the jury that by apportioning damages among the
non-settling and the settling defendants, the plaintiff may receive less
than full compensation for the damages sustained. 120
More recently, in Greenemeier v. Spencer 12 1 the Colorado Supreme
116. Id. at 304, 191 A.2d at 469.
117. Id.
118. Id. This sum may include compensation for bodily injuries, for pain
and suffering resulting from such injuries in the past, present and future, for the
effect of the injuries upon the plaintiff's health, and for any permanent disability
which has resulted or will result. Id. at 304, 191 A.2d at 469-70. In addition, the
sum must include all expenses related to plaintiff's efforts to cure or alleviate his
injuries and all loss of wages resulting from his inability to continue in his usual
occupation. Id. at 304, 191 A.2d at 470.
In Yardley v. Rucker Bros. Trucking, the Court of Appeals of Oregon con-
cluded that the trial court had not met the required standard for instructions
regarding a settlement. 42 Or. App. 239, 244, 600 P.2d 485, 488 (1979). The
trial court had instructed the jury to " 'arrive at the amount of such damages
without regard to any other defendants formerly in the case.' " Id. The appel-
late court held that the trial court erred in failing to unequivocally instruct the
jury to disregard the settlement and return a verdict for the full amount of the
plaintiff's damages. Id. In addition, the trial court erred by not informing the
jury that the court would deduct the settlement amount from the jury's damages
award. Id.
Although the Yardley court adopted the court rule as the method for calcu-
lating damages, the court did not present a firm rule regarding the admissibility
of evidence of a settlement at trial. Id. at 242, 600 P.2d at 487. The court stated
that either evidence of a settlement is not admissible, or under appropriate cir-
cumstances, such as to explain the absence of likely defendants, evidence of a
settlement may be admitted. Id. at 243, 600 P.2d at 487. However, the court
noted that evidence of the amount of a settlement is inadmissible before a jury.
Id. at 243, 600 P.2d at 488.
119. Theobold, 40 N.J. at 305, 191 A.2d at 470. The court explained that the
jury "should treat the matter as if no one other than [the] defendant were ever
involved in the accident and as if their only problem were to decide on the mon-
etary sum." Id.
120. Id. In Theobold, the Supreme Court of New Jersey suggested that the
jurors may have understood that they were to award damages representing the
share to be paid by the remaining defendants on trial. Id. at 308, 191 A.2d at
471. The jury returned a verdict of $65,000 and the plaintiff had settled with
two other defendants for $90,000 total. Id. at 298-99, 191 A.2d at 466-67.
Thus, the court stressed that the trial court must assure the jury that the court
will apportion the compensation amount as required by law. Id. at 305, 191
A.2d at 470.
121. 719 P.2d 710 (Colo. 1986).
NOTE
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Court adopted the intermediate approach espoused by the Theobold
court as most conducive to a verdict consistent with the evidence.' 2 2 As
in Theobold, the Greenemeier court stressed the importance of clear jury
instructions to assure that the jury returns an award that fully compen-
sates the plaintiff.'23 Contrary to the reasoning of those courts espous-
ing the view that a jury should not be informed of a settlement, the
Greenemeier court asserted that informing the jury of a settlement mini-
mizes the risk that the jury will impute liability or lack of liability to the
defendant simply because a defendant appears to have admitted respon-
sibility for plaintiff's damages by settling out of court. 124 The court
explained that informing the jury about the interrelation of the claims
against settling and non-settling defendants avoids prejudicial infer-
ences that may result when jurors speculate about the absence of poten-
tial defendants. 12 5
The Colorado Supreme Court concluded, however, that the jury
should not be informed of the amount paid in a settlement to minimize
the danger that the jury will reduce or increase the plaintiff's award
based on a belief that the plaintiff was overcompensated or undercom-
pensated by the settlement.' 26 Furthermore, the court cautioned that a
liberal rule which permits ajury to learn of a settlement cannot be abso-
lute.127 Instead, the court noted that in special circumstances, the trial
122. Id. at 715. The Greenemeier court noted that a jury will return an accu-
rate verdict when the jurors know that the verdict will be apportioned among the
defendants and settling parties as the law requires. Id.
In Greenemeier, the plaintiff suffered an eye injury when the defendants Spen-
cer and Sacco fired BB guns in plaintiff's direction. Id. at 711. Before trial,
Greenemeier settled his claim against Sacco for $100,000. Id. at 712. At trial,
the plaintiff requested that the jury be informed of the settlement and amount,
and the defendant Spencer requested that the jury be told of the settlement
only. Id. The trial judge refused both requests and disclosed nothing about the
settlement to the jury. Id.
123. Id. at 714-15. The court stated:
The jury must also be directed that if it concludes that the defendant is
liable, it must return an award that fully compensates the plaintiff for all
of his injuries without regard to the fact that the plaintiff may have re-
ceived compensation from others as a result of the settlement.
Id.
124. Id. at 715. The court stated:
By providing the jury with general information about the interrela-
tion of the claims against settling and non-settling parties, the Theobold
v. Angelos approach also serves to minimize any risk that the jury will
impute liability, or lack of liability, to the defendant simply by virtue of
the fact that some other potential defendant has "admitted" liability
through settlement.
Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. The court noted that "the jury is not even informed of the amount
of settlement and thus cannot use that amount as a yardstick with which to mea-
sure the damages to be assessed against the defendant." Id.
127. Id. The court noted:
Although the foregoing considerations persuade us that in the
562 [Vol. 32: p. 541
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court has discretion to vary from the rule when such variation is neces-
sary to promote a non-prejudicial verdict. 128
C. The Minority View: Permitting the Jury to Hear Evidence Concerning
Settlement and Amount
A minority of state courts have adopted the view that the jury
should be informed not only of the settlement, but also of the amount of
consideration given in exchange for plaintiff's covenant not to sue.'
29
In Steele v. Hash, 130 a California appellate court concluded that a jury had
the right to know of a settlement and its amount.131 Following the "jury
rule" for calculating damages, I3 2 the trial court in Steele instructed the
jurors to deduct the settlement amount from their verdict if they found
the non-settling defendant liable. 1 33 On appeal, the court upheld the
usual case ajury should be advised of the fact of settlement, but not the
amount, the many and varied circumstances in which the issue may
arise caution against adoption of an absolute rule. The trial court
should be allowed discretion to vary from this approach where special
circumstances convince the court that such variation will best promote
a verdict based on the facts and the applicable law. This will give ample
scope to the trial courts to evaluate the complex human and legal fac-
tors involved in assessing the likely effects of disclosure of settlements
and will promote verdicts based only on legally appropriate
considerations.
Id. at 715-16.
128. Id. Although the court failed to elaborate on the issue of "special cir-
cumstances," the court stated that to facilitate appellate review, the trial court
should articulate precisely what prompted its deviation from the normal rule.
Id. at 716; see also Degen v. Bayman, 86 S.D. 598, 200 N.W.2d 134 (1972). In
Degen, the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that whether a jury should be
informed of a prior settlement should be left to the discretion of the trial court.
Id. at 607, 200 N.W.2d at 139. The court said "[w]e can visualize no circum-
stances where the amount involved in a release or covenant need be disclosed to
the jury.., unless it clearly appears that a fair trial has been jeopardized." Id.
129. See, e.g., Anderson v. Kemp, 279 Ala. 321, 184 So. 2d 832 (1966);
Steele v. Hash, 212 Cal. App. 2d 1, 27 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1963); Haley v. Byers
Transp. Co., 394 S.W.2d 412 (Mo. 1965).
130. 212 Cal. App. 2d 1, 27 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1963). In Steele, defendant ac-
cidently drove his vehicle into another vehicle killing James Steele, a passenger
in the other vehicle. Id. at 2, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 853. Clyde Steele, as administrator
of his son's estate, sued both drivers for wrongful death. Id. Prior to trial, Steele
settled his claim against one driver for $2,500 and proceeded to trial against the
remaining defendant. Id. The trial court informed the jury of both the settle-
ment and amount and asked the jurors to deduct $2,500 from their total judg-
ment, should they find for the plaintiff. Id. at 2, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 854. The jury
returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. Id. at 2, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 853.
131. Id. at 4, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 855. The appellate court noted that the plain-
tiff had not found any California authority "indicating that a trial court is em-
powered to withhold certain evidence from the jury, allow them to arrive at a
verdict, and thereafter reduce that verdict on the basis of evidence which the
jury was not permitted to consider." Id. at 3-4, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
132. For a discussion of the "court rule" and "jury rule" for calculating
damages, see supra note 38.
133. Id. at 2, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
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plaintiff's verdict, noting that the trial court had wisely instructed the
jury to resolve the issue of defendant's liability prior to determining the
total amount of damages.' 3 4
Similarly, in Haley v. Byers Transportation Co.,135 the Missouri
Supreme Court followed the jury rule and permitted the jury to hear
evidence concerning the settlement and its amount.' 36 The court care-
fully instructed the jurors to determine the total amount of the plain-
tiff's damages and then deduct the amount of the settlement from the
total damages. 13 7 Because the Missouri courts follow the jury rule,
which requires the jury to make the deduction, the Haley court had no
occasion to discuss its reasoning for informing the jury of a settlement
and amount.13 8
IV. ANALYSIS
Although the various jurisdictions present three distinct approaches
to the issue of the extent of a jury's knowledge concerning settlement,
the various courts all select an approach which they believe avoids preju-
dice to both plaintiff and defendant and produces a fair verdict.13 9
While the goals of each approach are consistent, how courts view the
role and competence of the jury serves to determine which method a
134. Id. at 3, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
135. 394 S.W.2d 412 (Mo. 1965).
136. Id. at 415. In Haley, the plaintiff was permanently injured in a collision
between plaintiff's automobile and two tractor-trailers. Id. at 414. Plaintiff set-
tled his claim against one defendant for $80,000 and proceeded to trial against
the remaining tortfeasor. Id.
137. Id. at 414-15. The trial court partially instructed the jury:
If you find in favor of the plaintiff on his petition, then you must
award him such sum as you believe will fairly and justly compensate
him for such damages as you believe plaintiff sustained in the past and
is reasonably certain to sustain in the future as a direct result of the
negligence, if any, of the defendants.
Id. at 414.
138. Id. at 415; see also Anderson v. Kemp, 279 Ala. 321, 184 So. 2d 832
(1966). In Anderson, the court also applied the "jury rule," informing the jury of
the plaintiff's settlement with one defendant as well as the amount of the settle-
ment. Id. at 324, 184 So. 2d at 835. The court stated:
It is equally well settled, however, that a person injured by joint
tortfeasors may accept partial satisfaction and release one or more pro
tanto and proceed against the others. However, the tortfeasors not so
released may plead the release as a bar to that amount paid by the re-
leased tortfeasor or may place it in evidence showing payment for the
injury up to the amount shown in the release.
Id. at 323, 184 So. 2d at 834 (citing Steenhuis v. Holland, 217 Ala. 105, 115 So.
2 (1927); Wright v. McCord, 205 Ala. 122, 88 So. 150 (1920)).
139. See, e.g., Luth, 507 P.2d at 768 (withholding information from jury re-
garding settlement avoids prejudice and encourages extra-judicial settlements);
Steele, 212 Cal. App. 2d at 4, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 855 (jury has right to know of
settlement paid by tortfeasor); Greenemeier, 719 P.2d at 715 (advising jury of fact
of settlement avoids prejudicial inferences).
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court will follow."4
0
A number of commentators have addressed the issue ofjury compe-
tence.' 4 ' One noted researcher, Harry Kalven, commented that a jury
can operate effectively by collective recall. 142 From an extensive survey
of 8000jury trials, Kalven concluded that the jury understands its duties
sufficiently enough to produce a just result and that its intellectual in-
competence has been vastly exaggerated. 14 3 In a jurisdiction that
chooses to inform the jury of both the existence and the amount of the
settlement, while allowing the jury to perform the settlement deduction,
courts must assume a competence of the jury which Kalven discussed. 144
For example, in Steele, the California District Court of Appeal, presum-
ing that the jury was competent to determine the defendant's liability
and the amount of plaintiff's damages, held that the jury had a right to
know of a settlement and its amount. 14 5
Not all courts and commentators have expressed such confidence in
140. See, e.g., Greenemeier, 719 P.2d at 716. Upon deciding that juries should
be informed of a settlement but not the amount paid, the court explained that
this method was "in keeping with the confidence that we justifiably repose in
juries to resolve serious matters in a responsible, fair and impartial manner, ad-
hering to the instructions given by the court and uninfluenced by extraneous
considerations." Id.
141. See, e.g., Holstein, Jurors' Interpretations and Jury Decision Making, 9 LAW
AND HUM. BEHAV. 83, 86 (1985) (analysis of simulated jury deliberations indi-
cates jurors focus group decision-making on alternative notions of "what really
happened"); Kalven, The Dignity of the CivilJury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1066 (1964)
(intellectual incompetence not a problem injury trials) [hereinafter Kalven, Dig-
nity]; Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIo ST.
L.J. 158, 165 (1958) (jury may discount damages because of doubt of liability or
increase damages resulting from their belief as to degree of defendant's fault)
[hereinafter Kalven, Damage Award]; Vinson, Litigation: An Introduction to the Appli-
cation of Behavioral Science, 15 CONN. L. REV. 767, 786 (1983) (juror attempts to
fulfill his own needs in reaching decision) [hereinafter Vinson, Litigation]; Vin-
son, Psychological Anchors: Influencing the Jury, 8 LITIGATION 20, 21 (Winter 1982)
(jurors reason for fundamental premises to which they fit facts as received)
[hereinafter Vinson, Psychological Anchors].
142. Kalven, Dignity, supra note 141, at 1067. Kalven's study ofjury behav-
ior was an empirical research project of the University of Chicago Law School.
Id. at 1056. From a survey of 600 judges and 8000 civil jury trials, Kalven and
his colleagues analyzed the actual jury verdict, a hypothetical verdict from the
court, and explanations from the judge if he disagreed with the jury's verdict.
Id. at 1063.
143. Id. at 1067.
144. See, e.g., Steele, 212 Cal. App. 2d at 2, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 854. Courts such
as Steele espouse the "jury method" of calculating damages. The court in-
structed the jury as follows: " 'You are further instructed that a co-defendant
has paid the plaintiff two thousand dollars in settlement. This amount should be
deducted by you from the verdict, if you should find for the plaintiff.' " Id. at 2,
27 Cal. Rptr. at 854. For further explanation of the "jury method" and "court
method," see supra note 38.
145. 212 Cal. App. 2d at 4, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 855. For a discussion of Steele,
see supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
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the ability of jurors. 14 6 As behavioralist Donald Vinson has observed,
jurors are not always attentive during trial and even when they are espe-
cially interested in the trial,jurors cannot maintain a high-level attention
span for more than twenty minutes. 14 7 More specifically, Harry Kalven
observed that when ajury must compute plaintiff's damages, the court's
opportunities for control of the jury is limited. 148 The court's control is
usually limited by excluding evidence or withdrawing a prejudicial item
from the jury.149 Kalven recognized that non-disclosure of some infor-
mation raises policy questions. 150 Examples of such information in-
clude the fact that attorney's fees are not part of plaintiff's damages,
interest is not awarded from the time of injury, and plaintiff's award is
not subject to federal income tax.15 1 Kalven noted that his study sug-
gests that disclosure of such information would sensitize the jury and
cause the jurors to reach a different decision than they would have with-
out the information.15 2 Additionally, Kalven's study indicated that even
though a jury has been instructed to award full damages proved if they
find the defendant liable, jurors may discount damages because they
doubt defendant's liability. 15 3 Kalven reasoned that a discount can re-
sult where someone else is at fault and the jury believes the defendant
should not bear the entire burden. 154 Since Kalven's jury research indi-
146. See, e.g., Kalven, Damage Award, supra note 141, at 168 (jurors may im-
pute negligence by discounting defendant's burden because he was not totally
responsible); Vinson, Litigation, supra note 141, at 769 (jurors may fail to hear
important arguments because of lack of attention).
147. Vinson, Litigation, supra note 141, at 769. Vinson indicated that jurors
possess a pre-existing cognitive structure and have a basic need to reach a ver-
dict expeditiously. Id. at 778. Faced with the task of examining the evidence and
deciding a case, jurors, as Vinson observed, employ four coping behaviors to
achieve and maintain a cognitively consonant world: (1) pretend unwelcome in-
formation is nonexistent, (2) distort information until it is consonant with their
basic values, (3) minimize the importance of evidence that contradicts their basic
values, and (4) avoid any encounter with facts contrary to their decision. Vin-
son, PsychologicalAnchors, supra note 141, at 21. Vinson advises attorneys that to
increase their chance of a favorable verdict, they must anticipate which juror's
beliefs are consistent and which conflict with the possible views of the case and
adopt the view that is closely linked to the jurors' attitudes and beliefs. Id. at 22.
148. Kalven, Damage Award, supra note 141, at 160. Kalven noted thatjudge's instructions to the jury convey headings under which thejury may award
damages. Id. Because these headings are broad, Kalven observed that the chief
message of the instructions is to tell the jurors how free they are in determining
damages. Id.
149. Id. Kalven indicated that the judge has discretion to set aside exces-
sive or inadequate verdicts. Id.
150. Id. at 163.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 165-66.
154. Id. at 167. Kalven explained that the jury reacts to rules against imput-
ing negligence. Id. at 168. "It does so not by a logic directly challenging the
rule but by discounting defendant's burden because he was not totally responsi-
ble." Id.
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cates that jurors may use certain evidence in a manner that prejudices
either the plaintiff or defendant, courts that limit or exclude evidence of
a settlement and amount paid may be justified in their action. 155
Most jurisdictions recognize the problem that providing the jurors
with more information than is necessary to decide the issues of liability
and damages may lead to confusion and improper inferences that may
prejudice plaintiff and defendant. 156 As a result, most jurisdictions will
limit to some extent what information is disclosed to the jury. 157 Courts
such as Theobold and Greenemeier prohibit the introduction of evidence
concerning amount of settlement, while allowing the jury to learn of the
existence of a settlement. 15 8 These courts believe that informing the
jury of the amount of settlement increases the potential for prejudice while
informing them of the existence of the settlement reduces prejudicial infer-
ences. 159 The Colorado Supreme Court in Greenemeier noted that pro-
viding general information about the settlement minimizes "any risks
that the jury will impute liability, or lack of liability, to the defendant
simply by virtue of the fact that some other potential defendant has 'ad-
mitted' liability through settlement."16 0 The Theobold and Greenemeier
courts indicated that informing the jury of a settlement avoids specula-
tion about the absent defendant, thereby reducing prejudicial infer-
ences 16 1 and providing a fair environment for the plaintiff.16 2
The Brewer and Luth courts establish a stricter approach which pro-
hibits any reference to the jury as to the existence or amount of settle-
ment.1 63 Both courts observed that burdening the jury with extra facts
about a settlement may confuse the jury and prejudice plaintiff or de-
fendant. 164 Evidence of settlement may confuse the jurors because they
155. For a general discussion of how jurors react to evidence that impacts
on their decision regarding a plaintiff's damages award, see supra notes 152-54
and accompanying text.
156. See Brewer, 412 Mich. at 678-79, 316 N.W. 2d at 705; see also Greenemeier,
719 P.2d at 715.
157. See, e.g., Luth, 507 P.2d at 768 (neither settlement nor amount admissi-
ble); Greenemeier, 719 P.2d at 714 (fact of settlement admissible while amount
paid not admissible); Brewer, 412 Mich. at 679, 316 N.W.2d at 705 (neither set-
tlement nor amount admissible); Azure v. City of Billings, 182 Mont. 234, 244-
45, 596 P.2d 460, 466 (1979) (same); Theobold, 40 NJ. at 304, 191 A.2d at 469
(fact of settlement admissible while amount paid not admissible).
158. Greenemeier, 719 P.2d at 715; Theobold, 40 N.J. at 304, 191 A.2d at 469.
159. Greenemeier, 719 P.2d at 715; Theobold, 40 N.J. at 304, 191 A.2d at 469.
160. Greenemeier, 719 P.2d at 715.
161. Id.
162. Theobold, 40 N.J. at 304, 191 A.2d at 469.
163. Luth, 507 P.2d at 768; Brewer, 412 Mich. at 679, 316 N.W.2d at 705.
164. Luth, 507 P.2d at 768; Brewer, 412 Mich. at 677-79, 316 N.W.2d at 704-
05. Concluding that the jury is not to be informed of the existence or amount of
settlement, the Brewer court observed:
It is true that juries are expected to consider complicated facts and
instructions and that our adversary system relies upon their ability to
do so before reaching their conclusions. It is also true that jurors are
1987] 567NOTE
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may not understand fully the reason for settlement. 165 This lack of un-
derstanding may prejudice the plaintiff if the jury uses the settlement
amount as a gauge in determining damages or considers the settlement
as an admission of liability. 16 6 As the Michigan Supreme Court in Brewer
recognized, a small settlement compared to plaintiff's claim could be
used as a measure of actual damages, while a large settlement might
cause the jury to conclude that the settling party was primarily or totally
liable. 167 The Alaska Supreme Court in Luth held that informing the
jury of the settlement and amount was objectionable because of the po-
tential for inadequate damage verdicts resulting in frustration of the pol-
icy of encouraging extra-judicial settlements. 168 These same courts,
Luth and Brewer, also observed that the defendant could be prejudiced
when the jury has knowledge of a settlement and its amount. 169 Both
courts noted that a jury might conclude that the non-settling defendant
is liable from what appears to be an admission of liability by the settling
party. 170 Adopting the "court method," the Brewer and Luth courts con-
cluded that because the court performs the settlement deduction the
jury need not have knowledge of a settlement or its amount unless there
are questions of fact regarding the settlement. 17 1
It is submitted that withholding evidence of settlement and amount
paid as was done in Brewer and Luth will promote verdicts consistent with
the evidence presented when juries are not confused by the facts of set-
tlement. Therefore, the approach advocated by Steele is inadequate to
human and so are subject to suggestion and sometimes to confusion
concerning the relative importance of a mass of factual material and its
relationship to instructions from the bench.
412 Mich. at 678-79, 316 N.W.2d at 705.
165. See, e.g., Brooks v. Daley, 242 Md. 185, 194, 218 A.2d 184, 189 (1966)
(settlement could have caused jury confusion in assessing damages and could
have been misconstrued as admission of liability by settling party); Azure v. City
of Billings, 182 Mont. 234, 245-46, 596 P.2d 460, 467 (1979). InAzure, tlejury
was informed of plaintiff's settlement for $10,000 in a suit where plaintiff sought
over $1,000,000 in damages. Id. at 244, 596 P.2d at 466. The Supreme Court of
Montana considered the fact of settlement as an extraneous factor that could
have affected plaintiff because the jury award was only $20,000 yet undisputed
wage losses and medical expenses exceeded $60,000. Id. at 245-46, 596 P.2d at
467. The Azure court observed that the jury did not know the plaintiff settled for
$10,000 because it was the limit of the settling party's insurance policy. Id. at
246, 596 P.2d at 467.
166. Brewer, 412 Mich. at 677, 316 N.W.2d at 704 (jury could use settlement
amount as measure of damages); see also Brooks v. Daley, 242 Md. 185, 194, 218
A.2d 184, 189 (1966) (settlement could have been misconstrued as admission of
liability).
167. Brewer, 412 Mich. at 677, 316 N.W.2d at 704.
168. Luth, 507 P.2d at 768.
169. Id.; Brewer, 412 Mich. at 678, 316 N.W.2d at 705.
170. Luth, 507 P.2d at 768; Brewer, 412 Mich. at 678, 316 N.W.2d at 705.
171. Luth, 507 P.2d at 705; Brewer, 412 Mich. at 679, 316 N.W.2d at 705.
For a general discussion of the court rule, see supra note 38.
568 [Vol. 32: p. 541
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prevent prejudice to the plaintiff and defendant.17 2
It is suggested that the Brewer approach which precludes the jury
from learning of a settlement with another tortfeasor is the most equita-
ble approach because it avoids potential prejudice to the plaintiff and
defendant, focuses the jury on the crucial questions of liability and full
compensation, and encourages settlements.1 73
Prejudice to the non-settling defendant is avoided because the rule
prohibits the jury from imputing the settling defendant's "admission" of
liability to the non-settling defendant. 174 Similarly, prejudice toward
the plaintiff is diminished because the jury will not treat the settlement
as an admission of total liability by the settling defendant and speculate
that the non-settling defendant may not be liable. 17 5 Thus, the Brewer
and Luth approaches decrease the potential prejudice to the defendant
and plaintiff more effectively than do the approaches of Greenemeier and
Steele. 176
Furthermore, since prohibiting the introduction of a plaintiff's
prior settlement with another defendant reduces the potential prejudice
to the plaintiff in his trial with the remaining defendant, settlements are
encouraged instead of discouraged.' 77 The Brewer court reasoned that
settlements are encouraged because prohibiting evidence of a settle-
ment reduces the plaintiff's fear that his damages or chance of recovery
172. For a discussion of the approach advocated by Steele, see supra notes
130-34 and accompanying text.
173. For a discussion of the approach that prohibits the jury from being
informed of a settlement, see supra notes 45-101 and accompanying text.
174. See Luth, 507 P.2d at 768. In Luth, the court noted that "[s]ubmitting
the matter to the jury might prejudice the unreleased defendant, for the jury
might imply his negligence from the virtual admission of negligence by the cove-
nantee." Id.; see also Azure v. City of Billings, 182 Mont. 234, 245, 596 P.2d 460,
467 (1979) ("there is too great a danger that the jury will be adversely influ-
enced by extraneous factors which will creep into the jury's decision-making
process").
175. See Luth, 507 P.2d at 768 (disclosing settlement creates risk that pay-
ment of money for covenant not to sue might be evidence of the settling defend-
ant's total liability and exculpate remaining defendant); DeLude, 351 Ill. App. at
473, 115 N.E.2d at 565 ("jury considers [settlement] evidence that the cove-
nantee is the party responsible for the injury and that defendant or defendants
should be exculpated"); Brewer, 412 Mich. at 678, 316 N.W.2d at 705 (mere fact
of settlement could suggest liability on part of blameless non-settling defend-
ant); see also Brooks v. Daley, 242 Md. 185, 193-94, 218 A.2d 184, 189 (1966)
(settlement "could be construed incorrectly as an admission of liability on the
part of the settling third party defendant").
176. For a discussion of the Brewer approach, see supra notes 92-101 and
accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., Luth, 507 P.2d at 768 (to extent disclosure can result in uncer-
tain or inadequate verdicts "policies encouraging extra-judicial settlements will
be frustrated"); DeLude, 351 Ill. App. at 474, 115 N.E.2d at 565 (introducing
evidence of covenant not to sue jeopardizes plaintiff's opportunity for fair trial
and tends to discourage settlements); Cleere v. United Parcel Serv., 669 P.2d
785, 789 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983) (disclosure frustrates policy of settling lawsuits).
1987] NOTE 569
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may be lessened when the jury knows of a settlement. 17 8
In addition, prohibiting the introduction of the existence of a settle-
ment permits the jury to focus on the crucial task of determining the
liabilit)7 of the remaining defendants and the total compensation for the
plaintiff should the defendant be held liable.179 As Brewer emphasized,
although jurors are expected to consider complicated facts and instruc-
tions, they may become unnecessarily confused if overwhelmed with a
mass of factual information.180
More importantly, when deciding whether a jury should be in-
formed of a settlement or its amount, courts should focus on maximiz-
ing fairness to all parties and minimizing the prejudice to both the
plaintiff and the defendant, rather than on choosing an approach which
is merely compatible with its method of calculating damages where there
has been a settlement. 18 1 It is suggested that the court should first de-
cide whether the plaintiff or defendant could be potentially prejudiced if
the jury knew about a previous settlement.' 8 2 Depending upon its ap-
praisal of potential prejudice to the parties, the court can decide what
method to employ to calculate damages.18 3
178. See Brewer, 412 Mich. at 677, 316 N.W.2d at 704. The court stated:
[I]ntroduction to the jury of the settlement.., could appear to the jury
as an admission of liability, but with the real defendant out of the law-
suit .... [The plaintiff] argues that the jury could use the settlement
amount as a measure of damages. If the settlement was for a relatively
low amount compared to plaintiff's claim, plaintiff fears the jury would
use it as a measure of actual damages.
Id.; see also DeLude, 351 I11. App. 466, 474, 115 N.E.2d 561, 565 (introduction of
covenant would jeopardize plaintiff's opportunity for fair trial and tend to dis-
courage settlements).
179. See Luth, 507 P.2d at 766. The trial court refused to admit evidence of
a covenant not to sue because the covenant was irrelevant to the primary issue of
the defendant's vicarious liability. Id.; accord Theobold 40 N.J. at 304, 191 A.2d at
469-70. Although the Theobold court held that the jury should be informed of
the settlement but not the amount, the jury instructions regarding the jury's
duty to award total compensation for the plaintiff's injuries and losses are ap-
propriate. Id. at 307-08, 191 A.2d at 471-72. For the relevant text of the court's
instructions, see supra note 115.
180. Brewer, 412 Mich. at 678-79, 316 N.W.2d at 705. "If facts ... have or
should have no bearing upon either liability or ultimate damages, there appears
to be little cause to burden the jury with the added duty of calculating a liqui-
dated settlement into its deliberations." Id. at 679, 316 N.W.2d at 705; see also
Azure v. City of Billings, 182 Mont. 234, 247, 596 P.2d 460, 467 (1979) ("the
trial court can tell thejury that it is to concern itself only with the issues before it
and must not discuss or speculate why other persons are not also defendants in
the action").
181. See, e.g., Haley, 394 S.W.2d at 415 (court instructed jurors to deduct
settlement amount from determination of plaintiff's total damages making it
necessary for court to inform jury of settlement and amount paid).
182. See Brooks v. Daley, 242 Md. 185, 193, 218 A.2d 184, 189 (1966) (evi-
dence of settlement should not be admitted because of prejudicial effect to
plaintiff).
183. See Luth, 507 P.2d at 766 (trial court correctly barred evidence of set-
tlement and reduced jury's award by amount of settlement).
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It is further submitted that the Greenemeier approach of advising the
jury of the fact of settlement is insufficient because it increases the possi-
bility of prejudice to plaintiff and defendant where the jury imputes lia-
bility or lack of liability to the defendant. 184 Additionally, the Greenemeier
approach deters settlements' 8 5 and overreacts to the possibility that ju-
rors will speculate about absent defendants. 18 6 To alleviate the
problems of the Greenemeier approach yet remain within the confines of
Brewer, the court need only recognize the existence of absent parties
without informing the jury of their status.' 8 7 Proper jury instructions
can eliminate or greatly reduce any speculation about absent
defendants. '
8 8
Under the Brewer approach, the trial court should instruct the jury
not to speculate about why other potential defendants are not parties to
the action and to concern itself only with the issues presented.' 89 As the
Supreme Court of Montana observed in Azure v. City of Billings,'90 the
trial court will take care of these factors after the jury has reached its
verdict. 191
It is suggested that the court give clear, unequivocal instructions
that the jurors are to award damages whichfully compensate the plaintiff
184. See Brewer, 412 Mich. at 678, 316 N.W.2d at 705. But see Greenemeier,
719 P.2d at 715 (advising jury of interrelation of claims against settling and non-
settling parties minimizes risk that jury will impute liability or lack of liability).
185. See Brewer, 412 Mich. at 679, 316 N.W.2d at 705 (uncertainty of juror
reaction to fact of settlement considered foreseeable deterrent to settlements
between plaintiffs and co-defendants).
186. See Azure v. City of Billings, 182 Mont. 234, 246-47, 596 P.2d 460, 467
(1979) (although jury may be curious about absent potential defendants, court
can tell jury to be concerned with relevant issues and not speculate about absent
defendants). But see Greenemeier, 719 P.2d at 715 (advising jury of settlement
avoids prejudicial inferences which arise if jurors speculate about absent
defendants).
187. See Azure v. City of Billings, 182 Mont. 234, 247, 596 P.2d 460, 467(1979). The Supreme Court of Montana observed:
In some situations perhaps a settlement has been reached with a person
not then a defendant in the case; and in other cases perhaps a settle-
ment has not been reached; or perhaps another person, for whatever
reasons, has not been sued. Nonetheless, the trial court can tell the
jury that it is to concern itself only with the issues before it and must
not discuss or speculate why other persons are not also defendants in
the action.
Id.
188. For a discussion of the use of jury instructions to reduce speculation
about absent defendants, see supra note 187.
189. Azure v. City of Billings, 182 Mont. 234, 246-47, 596 P.2d 460, 467
(1979) (it is natural that jury would be curious as to why all potential defendants
are not before court).
190. 182 Mont. 234, 596 P.2d 460 (1979).
191. Id. at 247, 596 P.2d at 467; see also Brewer, 412 Mich. at 679, 316
N.W.2d at 705 (following jury verdict, upon motion by defendant, court shall
make necessary calculation and find amount by which jury verdict will be
reduced).
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for all his injuries and losses. This suggestion is also applicable to the
two minority approaches. 1 92 The Theobold court stressed that the com-
putation of damages must be made without regard to the total number
of persons involved in the incident causing the damages. 193 This in-
struction is essential whether the court or the jury deducts the settle-
ment amount from the plaintiff's total damages because the plaintiff's
total damages will be reduced as a result of the settlement. 19 4
Although it is submitted that the Brewer approach is proper, there
are occasions when an exception to the general rule is necessary to avoid
prejudice. 195 The Azure court recognized that when there are factual
controversies regarding a settlement, the jury should be informed of the
fact and perhaps even the amount paid. 196 Recognizing that the trial
court can best evaluate the circumstances which may indicate the need
for a deviation from the usual rule, the Greenemeier court concluded that
the trial court was to have such discretion to deviate. 19 7 In Ashby, the
Florida Court of Appeals refused to find an exception to the rule of non-
disclosure and ruled that the trial court erred in allowing plaintiff to in-
troduce a settlement to rebut defendant's references to the settled
defendant as an "independent eyewitness."' 19 8 While the relevant Flor-
192. See, e.g., Yardley v. Rucker Bros. Trucking, 212 Or. App. 239, 242, 600
P.2d 485, 487 (1979) (settlement may be disclosed "provided that the court then
instructs the jury in unequivocal language to disregard the settlement and return
a verdict for the full amount of the plaintiff's damages"); see also Greenemeier, 719
P.2d at 714; Theobold, 40 N.J. at 304, 191 A.2d at 469-70. In Greenemeier, the
court stated that the "jury must also be directed that if it concludes that the
defendant is liable, it must return an award that fully compensates the plaintiff
for all of his injuries without regard to the fact that the plaintiff may have re-
ceived compensation from others as a result of the settlement." 719 P.2d at
714-15. For the relevant text of the jury instructions proposed by the Theobold
court, see supra note 115.
193. Theobold, 40 N.J. at 304-05, 191 A.2d at 470.
194. See UCATA § 4(a), 12 U.L.A. at 98. A release given to a defendant at
the time of settlement "reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any
amount stipulated by the release ... or in the amount of the consideration paid
for it whichever is the greater." Id. For a discussion of the two methods used by
courts in determining the effect of a settlement and release on the plaintiff's
claim against the remaining defendants, see supra notes 32-43 and accompany-
ing text.
195. See Greenemeier, 719 P.2d at 715 (varying circumstances caution against
adoption of absolute rule); Azure, 182 Mont. at 247, 596 P.2d at 467 ("a certain
amount of discretion must be vested in the trial court so that each situation can
be dealt with on a separate basis").
196. Azure, 182 Mont. at 247, 596 P.2d at 467. The Azure court explained
that an obvious example of when the jury should have knowledge of the settle-
ment amount is the proper reapportionment of damages among several
tortfeasors who are jointly and severally liable to plaintiff. Id.
197. Greenemeier, 719 P.2d at 715-16. The Greenemeier court indicated that a
trial court choosing to deviate from the general rule should specify its reasons in
order to facilitate appellate review. Id.
198. 458 So. 2d at 336. For the relevant facts of Ashby, see supra text accom-
panying notes 55-57.
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ida statute prohibits informing the jury of a settlement, 199 it is submit-
ted that in order to reduce potential prejudice to the plaintiff, the
appellate court should have recognized an exception to show possible
bias of a witness.2 0 0 In such an instance, the concern of Brewer of pro-
moting settlements is no longer present, and the prejudice to the plain-
tiff outweighs any prejudice to the defendant.
The Pennsylvania rule of evidence applied in Weingrad and Rule 408
of the Federal Rules of Evidence permit limited exceptions to the rule of
nondisclosure of settlements. 20 ' The stricter Pennsylvania rule allows
evidence of a settlement only where the final settlement has been
pleaded as a complete defense. 20 2 Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence permits admission of evidence of a settlement for other purposes
such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness. 20 3 The Pennsylvania and
Federal Rules of Evidence are attempts to promote the proper balance
suggested in this note. Generally, evidence of the existence and the
amount of settlement should be withheld from the jury except in those
rare instances where undue prejudice results because an adverse party's
evidence remains unchallenged. 20 4
V. CONCLUSION
While joint and several liability remains a viable doctrine in many
jurisdictions, the problem of what evidence should be admitted for the
jury's consideration when one or more jointly liable defendants settle
199. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.041(3) (West 1986). For the text of section
768.041(3), see supra note 52.
200. See Ashby, 458 So. 2d at 336-37. The Ashby court referred to a previous
Florida case where the plaintiff had argued that the defendant "had opened the
door to the issue of the witness's credibility" but the court refused to admit
evidence of a settlement "except under unusual circumstances." Id. (citing City
of Coral Gables v. Jordan, 186 So. 2d 60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), aff'd, 191 So. 2d
38 (Fla. 1966). In Jordan, the Florida District Court of Appeals indicated that
"unusual circumstances exist where some species of fraud or other questionable
practice is indulged in to procure or influence" the testimony of a witness. 186
So. 2d at 63 (quoting Fenberg v. Rosenthal, 348 Ill. App. 510, 518, 109 N.E.2d
402, 405 (1952)). Although the plaintiff in Ashby was concerned about biased
testimony of the witness who had settled, the appellate court refused to recog-
nize this as an unusual circumstance. 458 So. 2d at 336-37.
201. See FED. R. EvID. 408; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6141(c) (Purdon
1982). For the text of FED. R. EVID. 408, see supra note 69. For the text of
section 614 1(c), see supra note 60.
202. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 614 1(c) (Purdon 1982). For a discussion of
Weingrad in which section 614 1(c) was applicable, see supra notes 60-68 and ac-
companying text.
203. FED. R. EvID. 408. For a discussion of rule 408 and application of the
rule in Young, see supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
204. See Young, 539 F. Supp. at 196 (trial judge should weigh need for evi-
dence admitted under exception against potential discouragement of future set-
tlements) (citing 2J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 408[05]
(1978)). For a discussion of exceptions to the general rule of nondisclosure, see
supra notes 195-203 and accompanying text.
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with a plaintiff exists. For several decades, courts have established a
three-way split regarding what the jury should be told about a plaintiff's
settlement and amount paid. How courts view the role and competence
of the jury has provided the basis for the courts' approaches to this
problem. Although courts advocating an approach provide some ration-
ale for their choice, the approach that prohibits informing the jury of the
existence or amount of settlement appears to be the best approach for
avoiding prejudice to the plaintiff and defendant and encouraging settle-
ments because it prevents juries from speculating about the liability of
settled defendants.
Cynthia A. Sharo
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